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THE PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY: SOVEREIGNTY
AND ASSOCIATIONS IN THE COMMON LAW
ARTHUR J. JACOBSON*
INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a unified account of the Anglo-American
law of associations.1 It includes agency, partnership, trust, joint
stock company, corporation, and the fundamental and pervasive
concept of fiduciary relations.2 The law of associations, I contend,
can properly be understood only as a distribution of sovereignty to
private persons beyond the precincts of the state apparatus.3 The
significance of this contention is that relations we deem altogether
private, such as agency, involve direct participation in sovereign
power. Hence, theories of state and economy that divorce sover-
.eignty from the daily business of private life are in error.4
A proper 'understanding of the law of associations, therefore,
begins by rejecting the notion that the doctrine of sovereignty can-
not be reconciled with a broad decentralization of power.5 Sover-
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
B.A. 1969, J.D. 1974, Ph.D. 1978, Harvard University.
The author wishes to thank Edward DeGrazia, David Haber, John Hanks, Eugene
Harper, Stewart Sterk, Elliot Weiss, Edward Yorio, and the late Monrad G. Paulsen for
reading and commenting on the manuscript with empathy and encouragement. Joan Lipton,
Paul Shupack, and Richard Weisberg patiently insisted the author use modes of discourse
appropriate to the material.
1. The Anglo-American literature on associations is sparse. It counts one treatise, H.
SMITH, THE LAw OF ASSOCIATIONS (1914), and a handful of methodical articles. See, e.g.,
Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 HRv. L. REv. 977 (1929); Fuller,
Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIlTIONS 3 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1969).
2. The series does not include the family or voluntary association (club). Neither fits
the definition of association as a shifting or distribution of legal responsibility among per-
sons. See note 11 infra. As the common law contains no definitive canon of "associations,"
the term itself could easily be eliminated. The subject of the account, then, is a series of
legal institutions, rather than an abstraction called "association."
3. Both "association" and "sovereignty" are defined in text accompanying notes 11 &
12 infra.
4. For a recent expression of such a theory, see R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPO-
RATION (1979); Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Prop-
erty Model, 30 IHAsTmGs L.J. 1327 (1979).
5. For a classic statement that sovereignty cannot be reconciled with decentralization,
see H. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 1, 26-29 (1921); Laski, The Personality of
Associations, 29 HI-Rv. L. Rav. 404 (1916), reprinted in H. LASKI, supra, at 139, 169. See
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eignty itself in our tradition has been the instrument of decentrali-
zation. Courts and legislatures have used the law of associations to
distribute a portion of sovereignty to private persons. Yet neither
courts nor legislatures have acknowledged that they distribute sov-
ereignty or that the means of distribution is the law of associa-
tions. The doctrine of sovereignty, as we have it, does not easily
yield either proposition.
Our traditions of legal and political thought reflect a discom-
fort with the private association of persons.' Hobbes, for example,
saw corporations as "many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels
of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man."'7 The
doctrine of sovereignty, he knew, could be used to justify the
pretensions of corporations as easily as it could justify the claim of
the state to absolute power. In principle, however, sovereignty le-
gitimizes but the single association of commonwealth, governed by
one state apparatus. Inferior associations, such as corporations, ex-
ist only as articulations in the formal structure of the central appa-
ratus. To tolerate corporations is to qualify rivals to the legitimacy
of the commonwealth. The purpose of sovereignty, then, would
fail: "For what is it to divide the Power of the Common-wealth,
but to dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each
other."'8
generally 0. GIRKE, NATuRA LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 62-69 (E. Barker ed. 1950).
But cf. Adams, Nature of Law: Methods and Aim of Legal Education, in CENTRALIZATION
AND THE LAW: SCmNTmIC LEGAL EDUCATION 22-23 (1906). For an account of the origin of the
link between sovereignty and centralization, see RIESENBERG, INALIENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY
IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT (1956).
6. The discomfort results from the hostility of a central political apparatus towards any
combination of persons, more or less formal, more or less institutionalized, that threatens or
could threaten the monopoly of the central apparatus on all forms of power. Roman law, for
example, has in it surprisingly few mechanisms (notably agency and business corporations)
for the association of persons without the consent and control of the central apparatus. See
0. GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW 127 (G. Heiman ed. 1977); R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES §§
37-38, 88 (trans. J. Ledlie 1940). The achievement of Anglo-American law has been to pro-
vide a wealth of mechanisms for private association, while dampening the threat of these
associations to the central apparatus both directly through administrative control of mar-
kets, etc., and indirectly through substantive doctrines in the law of associations. For exam-
ple, the law of partnerships accords the partnership device only to persons whose collective
aim is to profit by business activity. See notes 104-116 infra & accompanying text. The
alms, indeed the existence, of a partnership are tempered and constrained by the stern dis-
cipline of the market. Hence the central apparatus could control associations conducted as
partnerships by seemingly autonomous forces, unconnected to political dominion.
7. T. HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 257 (1909) (previously published in London 1651).
8. Id. at 251.
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Even those, unlike Hobbes, who reject the doctrine of sover-
eignty, either ignore the association of persons, or attempt to as-
similate it to a quite different fundamental doctrine, such as the
law of contract.9 In this view, an association is, like all legal rela-
tions, the sum of consensual arrangements among persons, forming
spontaneously without the artifice of sovereignty. Yet a principle
theme of this Article is that associations, from agency to corpora-
tion, cannot be understood simply as instances of contract. To re-
duce associations to contract, one must either transform the tradi-
tional doctrine of contract, or obliterate certain doctrines
characteristic of the law of associations. 10 Both parties, the friends
and the enemies of sovereignty, have confined associations to a
vanishing point between dissolving altogether into the natural
world of contract and disappearing into the grasping unity of the
state apparatus. Only compromise and confusion has allowed the
reality of associations to coexist with our main traditions of legal
and political theory.
The first task, then, is to recall the theoretical traditions that
have met the law of associations with scepticism and suspicion,
and reconstruct these traditions to accommodate associations. Our
legal theory has misconceived associations precisely because the
battle line between the friends and enemies of sovereignty has
been so strictly drawn. The enemies of sovereignty must surrender
their notion that private relations can be constructed entirely from
spontaneous agreements among persons, without reference to sov-
ereignty. They must reconcile themselves to the proposition that
private persons who enter into associations make use of a portion
of sovereign power. So too, the friends of sovereignty must allow a
portion of sovereignty to be distributed among private persons so
that it can in fact be an instrument in the autonomous construc-
tion of private associations. Only once each side to the dispute over
sovereignty sacrifices a point in its position, can associations take
their place in legal theory.
9. See, e.g., 0. GIRKE, supra note 5, at 62, 70-79; 1 F. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY 39-54, 91-93 (1973) [hereinafter cited as F. HAYEK I]; F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUIrON
OF LIBERTY 148-61 (1960) [hereinafter cited as F. HAEK H].
10. The doctrine of authority, for example, can be reduced to contract only by ignoring
the fact authority empowers the recipient rather than binds him. Moreover, authority em-
powers the recipient to bind who would not be bound under the doctrines of contract. See
text accompanying notes 75-80 infra. But see F. MarAND, The Unincorporate Body in 3
THE COLLECTED PAPERSoF FREDERIC WILLiAM MAITLAND 271-84 (H. Fisher ed. 1911).
[Vol. 29
SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSOCIATIONS
The second task is to isolate a primitive element of associa-
tions that also serves as a rudimentary distribution of sovereignty.
The primitive element, I contend, is the broad class of fiduciary
relations. The fiduciary relation is at once the minimum, or kernel,
of association, and a distribution of a portion of sovereignty to one
of the participants in the relation. All other associations-agency,
partnership, joint stock company, trust, and corporation-are built
upon this primitive element as a series of modifications of fiduciary
relations. Agency, for example, is a form of fiduciary relation in
which the beneficiary, or principal, unlike the beneficiary of the
primitive fiduciary relation, exercises control over the content of
his fiduciary's activity. Actions of the fiduciary, the agent, unlike
actions of the primitive fiduciary, constitute legally binding action
of the beneficiary. Agency, therefore, is a form of fiduciary relation
in which both participants share in the distribution of sovereignty.
The final task, then, is to trace the construction of higher forms of
association from the rudimentary distribution of sovereignty in
fiduciary relations.
I. DISTRIBUTING SOVEREIGNTY
The thesis of this Article has two sides. First, the state appa-
ratus in our tradition distributes a portion of sovereignty to per-
sons not formally subject to bureaucratic control. Second, this dis-
tribution generates a series of legal institutions-agency,
partnership, and the like-found in the law of associations.
A. Two Methods of Proof
One might attempt to prove both propositions at once, defin-
ing "sovereignty" and "association" so that the latter, by dint of
forced or contrived deductions, appears to be a distribution of the
former. "Association," for example, may plausibly be defined as
any relatioh exhibiting a shifting or distribution of legal responsi-
bility controlled by the participants in the relation.11 "Sover-
11. Anglo-American law de-emphasizes the formal definition of "association," except as
a technical word for "club." See note 13 infra. "Association" in our legal system, in contrast
to those on the Continent, has never been the focus of political or systematic legal dispute.
See, e.g., Barker, Introduction to 0. GIERKs, NATURA LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIErY
LVII-LX (E. Barker ed. 1950); J. BmssAuD, HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW § 589 (3 Con-
tinental Legal History Series 1912); Heiman, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, ASSOCATIONS AND
LAW 32-33 (G. Heiman ed. 1977); R. HuEBNRE, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW § 15 (4
6031980]
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eignty," according to the theory that defines it, is the source of
binding commands, called law.12 The deduction of "association" as
a distribution of "sovereignty" might proceed as follows.
The sovereign commands persons. A command informs the
persons which of their actions the sovereign considers legally sig-
nificant, in that it attaches a binding consequence to the commis-
sion of such actions. A command thus compels the sovereign to
complete two further tasks. First, it must attribute actions defined
as legally significant to one person or another. Second, the sover-
eign must assign benefits and harms to persons according to the
binding consequence of actions thus attributed. "Person" thus sig-
nifies one to whom action is attributed, and a unit of account to
which the sovereign assigns legal benefits and harms. The person
is, in sum, the bearer of legal responsibility. To be sovereign, fol-
lowing the course of this deduction, is to exercise control over legal
responsibility. But a private person, exercising such control, pos-
sesses an attribute of sovereignty. Consequently, an association, in
which the participants control assignment of legal responsibility,
represents an exercise of sovereignty by persons outside the state
apparatus.
A formally'proper deduction, however, cannot provide suffi-
cient proof of the thesis. For "sovereignty" and "association" have
never played more than a specialized role in Anglo-American pri-
vate law.1" Courts and commentators have not resorted to either
term in framing doctrines of agency, partnership, and other as-
sociations. "Sovereignty" has simply not been available to them for
the construction of such doctrines, because theorists of sovereignty
Continental Legal History Series 1918); Maitland, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE XVI-XXXII (1913).
12. The theory is called legal positivism. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE, Lectures I, VI (R. Campbell ed. 1885); T. HOBBES, supra note 7, at 203-23. See text
accompanying notes 20-22 infra. See generally A. D'ENTREvES, THE NOTION OF THE STATE
Part H (1967).
13. See "Association" in 4A WoRDs AND PHRASES (perm. ed. 1969). "Association" un-
modified means only a "confederacy or union for particular purposes, good or ill," Allen v.
Stevens, 33 A.D. 485, 507, 54 N.Y.S. 8, 23 (1898), and has limited doctrinal significance.
When modified, as in "business association," it is typically replaced by a particular technical
term, such as "partnership," or "corporation." The "law of associations" commonly refers to
the branch of law regarding clubs, fraternal organizations, and the like.
The word "sovereignty" occurs only in doctrines having directly to do with the state,




have until recently confined its exercise to persons overtly affili-
ated with the state apparatus. Furthermore, English lawyers, un-
like their colleagues on the Continent, saw little need for a "the-
ory" of associations to support the practical requirements of their
commercial clients. Hence a unifying, argumentative definition of
association, given its wealth of practical forms in Anglo-American
law, has always seemed superfluous. Definitions of sovereignty and
association cannot be grounded in private law doctrine. Any defini-
tion, or deduction from definition, smacks of the arbitrary.
The proof I offer follows quite another path. Rather than a
deduction from definitions, I present the construction of a series of
institutions from the elementary institution of fiduciary relations.
The elementary institution provides a transition between private
transactions and the exercise of sovereign power. The lineaments
of fiduciary relations, I suggest, can be explained no other way. 14
Subsequent institutions in the series-agency, partnership, and the
like-are built upon fiduciary relations to reflect a progressive ab-
sorption of public authority into the realm of private transactions.
Yet, even a constructive proof must reckon with the confine-
ment of sovereignty within the state apparatus. One cannot recog-
nize the appearance of sovereignty in fiduciary relations without
first reconstructing sovereignty to play a role outside the state
apparatus.
Modern theorists, I contend, have defined sovereignty as legis-
lation, which they confine to the state apparatus. 5 Only in the past
generation have two theorists, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart,
sought to release a portion of sovereignty to private persons.' 6
Their effort, in part, is an attempt to defend legislation from the
charge that it is at best ineffective and at worst destructive of
spontaneous social and economic arrangements existing alongside
14. See Part II infra.
15. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION ch. 13 (E. Dumont ed.) (2d ed.
R. Hildreth trans. 1874). See generally N. ROSENBLUM, BENTAM'S THEORY OF THE MODERN
STATE 9-26 (1978).
16. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAw §§ 36-40 (1967). Cf. 2 M. WESER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 730 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds.
1968) (a translation of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (4th ed. Tilbingen 1956), citing A. Voigt,
Wirtschaft und Recht, 2 ZEScHRwr FOR SozLwLWIssENscHAiT (1911); Die Wirtschaftlichen
Gater als Rechte, 4 Archiv ffir Rechts- und WmTScHAFPrSPmLosoPHmE (1913). See also H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAw 5-8 (tent. ed. 1958); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201
(1937), and the sources cited therein.
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the superficial structure of sovereignty.17 The state, the challengers
urge, need only cure the occasional defects of spontaneous social
order by settling disputes among private persons. Law, in their es-
timation, is contract, a reflection of spontaneous social order.
Those who wish to preserve the theory of legislation, accordingly,
have justified contract as a private form of legislation."'
But contract alone, I will show, does not constitute associa-
tions, understood as the shifting of legal responsibility among per-
sons. Only by returning to the original view of sovereignty as en-
forcement, rather than legislation, is it possible to find in the
doctrine of sovereignty a source of associations. 9
17. See, e.g., F. HAYEK I, supra note 9, at 72-93.
18. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 16, at 94; H. KELsEN, supra note 16, at § 35(h).
19. John Locke, for example, considered sovereignty to be enforcement:
Man, being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom and uncon-
trolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature equally
with any other man or number of men in the world, has by nature a power not
only to preserve his property-that is, his life, liberty, and estate-against the
injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of
that law in others as he is persuaded the offense deserves, even with death itself
in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it. But be-
cause no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power
to preserve the property and, in order thereunto, punish the offenses of all those
of that society, there and there only is political society where every one of the
members has quitted his natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the
community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the
law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member
being excluded, the community comes to be umpire by settled standing rules,
indifferent and the same to all parties, and by men having the authority from
the community for the execution of those rules decides all the differences that
may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of
right, and punishes those offenses which any member has committed against the
society with such penalties as the law has established; whereby it is easy to dis-
cern who are, and who are not, in political society together.
J. LocKE, THn SEcoND TTiSE OF GovEmENT 48-49 (1952) (previously published in
London 1764 & 1690). Hobbes devotes the major part of his LEViATHA a to the construction
of a single person, the sovereign, from a multitude. The test for delimiting a single person,
as for Locke, is the exercise of one judgment:
The only way to erect such a Common Power... is to conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as
to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and
every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that
so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which
concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills,
every one to his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment. This is more than
SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSOCIATIONS
B. Two Notions of Sovereignty
"Sovereignty" is a term that completes a certain definition of
law. Law, in the language of legal positivists, is a command of the
sovereign.2 0 But "sovereignty" is more mysterious than the term it
defines. There would be little purpose in using it, were it not for
the destructive effect of sovereignty in opposing two propositions:
that law is revelation, and that law is nature discovered by rea-
son.21 Sovereignty is as invisible as God; it is as abstract as the law
of nature. Yet it succeeds, when it is used, in removing both of
them from the process of legislation. When the time comes, how-
ever, in which they must say something positive about sovereignty,
positivists simply turn the definition of law around, using law to
define sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this circle, is the source of com-
mands, called law.22
The abstraction and circularity of the definition is to posi-
tivists the very essence, indeed the virtue, of their position on law.
One breaks out of the circle of definition only by adopting a sub-
stantive criterion for recognizing law, such as revelation or reason.
No society, however committed to the project, could forever agree
on such a substantive criterion. Formal opposition would yield to
informal opposition, as interpreters of the agreed upon criterion
would inevitably produce competing and ungovernable claims to
authenticity. These interpreters of the substantive criterion would
require a forum in which their claims could be reconciled defini-
tively. Whether the forum is a church, a council of the enlightened,
Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person.
T. HoBBEs, supra note 7, at 131. See also id. at 129-30; R. POLIN, POLrrIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIM
CHEz HOBBES ch. 10 (1953). Both Locke and Hobbes have language concerning the
supremacy of legislative power. One must distinguish, however, between the nature of sover-
eignty, which is enforcement, and the wholesale way in which enforcement can be con-
ducted, which is legislation. Legislation is a supreme form of enforcement. See text accom-
panying notes 30-33 infra.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. See, e.g., J. BENTAsm, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PmNCPLES OF MORALs AND LEGISLA-
TON 17 n.1, 21-22 (1948) (previously published in London 1823 & 1789).
22. Thus Austin finds the "superiority which is styled sovereignty" where "[tihe bulk of
the given society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and common
superior. . . " who is not in a similar habit of obedience. J. AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 220.
Austin's definition of "sovereignty" depends on the fact of obedience, which, in turn, de-
pends on the command of a determinate and common superior. Sovereignty is, therefore,
the source of law that works.
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or the ordinary bureaucratic executive, it would be one form or an-
other of state apparatus. Positivists claim that the state apparatus
rules, because substantive criteria do not, nor do the several inter-
pretations of a single criterion. The state apparatus rules, however,
only if it lacks competitors. Promulgation of commands by sepa-
rate and distinct authorities, according to positivists, would lead to
a clash of commands, with no recourse to mediation by an objec-
tive criterion. The sole criterion positivists impose on the circle of
definition, therefore, is that sovereignty be unitary and located in
the state apparatus. Law is defined, not by a substantive criterion,
but by its unique and exclusive institutional source in the state
apparatus.2 3
Refusing to recognize an objective criterion forces positivists
to narrow the ambit of sovereignty one step further, within the
activities of, the state apparatus. For commands do not enforce
themselves. The state apparatus must be prepared to enforce com-
mands as well as issue them. Yet the enforcement of a command,
even if it is carried out by the same official, can diverge or appear
to diverge from its issuance. This potential divergence between is-
suance and enforcement, between legislation and execution,
presents a choice for legal positivism. One or the other, issuance or
enforcement, has to be primary.
If, as for positivists follQwing Bentham, issuance is recognized
as primary, enforcement must proceed as though it were self-evi-
dent and automatic, adding nothing to the direct terms of com-
mand.24 Otherwise enforcement, which ought to be nothing but the
realization of commands, usurps the place of issuance, and the sov-
ereign is rent by a forbidden clash of legislative powers. Likewise,
if enforcement is primary, as for the original positivists, such as
Locke, then the separate office of issuance may, like courts, articu-
late only the most unimpeachable precedents and rules of justice2 5
In either instance, to choose one side of sovereignty is to limit,
truncate, or suppress the other altogether.
23. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
24. J. BENTHAm, supra note 15, at 153-56.
25. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society but only in many
cases are drawn closer and have by human laws known penalties annexed to
them to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal
rule to all men, legislators as well as others.
J. LoCKE, supra note 19, at 77. Cf. note 14 supra.
[Vol. 29
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The choice between issuance and enforcement suggests several
consequences, far exceeding the scope of this Article. A few, how-
ever, are crucial. In the original view of sovereignty as enforce-
ment, law made by the office of issuance, or legislation, differs in
form, but not in substance from law made by the office of enforce-
ment, or common law; it is the refined discussion of fairness in
transactions, modelled after the tradition of the Yearbooks. Legis-
lation, like law, ought not to interfere with the individual welfare
of participants in transactions. Relief from the distress of law, if
any, should be had through the limited administration of equity,
not through law. In the more modern view of sovereignty as legisla-
tion, quite the opposite holds. Individual welfare is the very sub-
stance of legislation. 6 If a form of transaction, created slowly over
centuries by the courts, ceases to contribute to individual welfare,
then the sovereign must do away with it, no matter how fair it
seems. The test of transactions is substantive welfare, not fairness.
Law itself provides relief from distress.
I intend to show that the foundation of associations, the
fiduciary relation, expresses a concern for individual welfare em-
bedded in the office of enforcement. The fiduciary relation stands
as a challenge to the divided house of positivism: concern for wel-
fare tied to the locus of enforcement, not to legislation.
The first consequence of the choice between issuance and en-
forcement leads to a second: distinct definitions of "Person.
'2
7 If
sovereignty is legislation, "person" is first of all the bearer of indi-
vidual welfare, a unit of account for benefits and harms. But the
guiding rule of enforcement under a regime of legislation is that
the sovereign assigns benefits and harms according to the binding
26. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 1, 95.
27. For general discussions of legal personality, see W. BucKLAND & A. McNAm, ROMAN
LAW AmD COMMON LAW 23-59 (2d ed. 1952); P. DuFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PrrATE LAW
(1938); F. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1930); A. NEKAM, THE PERSONALrrY CONCEPTION
OF THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938); Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21
LAw Q. REv. 365 (1905); Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 LAw Q. REv. 90 (1911); Machen,
Corporate Personality (pts. 1, 2), 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347 (1911); F. MAITLAND, Moral
Personality and Legal Personality in 3 CoLLEcTn PAsEmRs OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND
304-20 (H. Fisher ed. 1911); Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 643 (1932); Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1924).
See also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 469-90 (3d ed. 1927); 9 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 45-71 (1926); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486-97 (S. Milsom ed. 1968) (2d ed. 1898).
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consequence of attributed action. "Person" thus signifies as well
one to whom action is attributed, obeying or disobeying the terms
of legislation." If, however, sovereignty is enforcement, "person"
signifies more than one to whom action is attributed, more than a
unit of account to which the sovereign assigns benefits and harms.
The original positivists had a third term in the doctrine of persons
that the more modem positivists saw fit to eliminate: "person" is
one whose actions result from an exercise of judgment.
For modem positivists, persons have judgment, if at all, only
to calculate the pleasurable or painful consequences of action.
"Nature," wrote Bentham, "has placed mankind under the govern-
ance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them
alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do."29 But the judgment required to calculate pains
and pleasures is a strictly individual sort of judgment. No rule of
calculation, no judgment, is common to everyone, as no one can be
told his pleasure.
Law as enforcement, in contrast, appeals precisely to universal
judgment.80 Persons may, it is true, calculate personal pains and
pleasures. But the enforcing authority holds them to calculate as
well the legal consequence of actions, even in the absence of a spe-
cific, legislated command. In return, the enforcing authority con-
fines its creation of law to universal rules of judgment that any
person could be expected to foresee. In a real sense the person aids
in making law as he confronts the challenges of daily life, his indi-
vidual judgment to be ratified or not by the universal judgment of
the enforcing authority.8 1 Legislation, quite the contrary, contem-
plates persons only as animals to control. It appeals not to their
28. See J. BENTHAm, supra note 21, chs. 4, 7.
29. See id. at 1.
The Expositor, keeping within his sphere, has no concern with any other fac-
ulties of the mind than the apprehension, the memory, and the judgment: the
latter, in virtue of those sentiments of pleasure or displeasure which he finds
occasion to annex to the objects under his review, holds some intercourse with
the affections.
J. BENTHAm, A Fragment on Government, in A B~mwr. READER 46 (M. Mack ed. 1969).
30. Hobbes' project in his LmmTmm is to show the conditions under which universal
judgment is possible. See T. HoBEs, supra note 7, at 49-52 (especially the definitions of
"judgment" and "conscience"); J. LOCKE, supra note 19, at 44-54. See note 19 supra.
31. For a recent formulation of the doctrine of universal judgment, see D'Amato, The
Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L.J. 468, 489-91, 497-505 (1978).
[Vol. 29610
SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSOCIATIONS
judgment, but to whatever induces their compliance.3 2 Law as en-
forcement is less a command of the sovereign to persons than the
judgment of persons en masse replacing the judgment of individual
persons."3
The choice between definitions of person requires a further
choice between definitions of association. Association has formally
been defined as a shifting or distribution of legal responsibility
among persons." Legal responsibility, in turn, was regarded as
modern positivists regard it, embracing the two sides of person as
they see person: attribution of action, and assignment of benefits
and harms. In the stance where sovereignty is enforcement, how-
ever, legal responsibility must also embrace judgment. Action,
then, may be attributed only to persons whose exercise of judg-
ment may be said to have caused the action; and binding conse-
quence proceeds from action only when the enforcing power of the
sovereign, judgment en masse, concurs in the decisions of individ-
ual judgment. When it is included, therefore, judgment, ini the
strong sense of legal calculation, becomes the centerpiece of the
doctrine of persons, hence a crucial element of legal responsibility.
If the stance of enforcement is valid, then a shift of judgment
should accompany the distribution of legal responsibility that de-
fines association. The presence or absence of a shift of judgment
provides a crucial empirical test in the law of associations for the
choice between sovereignty as enforcement and sovereignty as leg-
islation. Yet, a shift of judgment from one person to another is the
essential feature of the most rudimentary association, the fiduciary
relation. Thus the presence of shifting judgment in fiduciary rela-
tions vindicates the claim of the original positivists, that sover-
eignty is enforcement, not legislation.
The final consequence of the choice between enforcement and
32. Compliance may flow from passions we find attractive, such as public spirit, or
unattractive, such as fear. Legislation can function either through democratic or totalitarian
forms.
33. I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of
seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge of Good
and Evill actions. This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are
no Civill Lawes; and also under Civil Government, in such cases as are not de-
termined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good
and Evil actions, is the Civill Law, and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes
Representative of the Commonwealth.
T. HOBBES, supra note 7, at 249. See J. LocKE, supra note 19, § 87.
34. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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legislation is perhaps most significant, since it has raised a chal-
lenge in the past century to the very notion of sovereignty. If sov-
ereignty is legislation, then what persons do has absolutely no sig-
nificance in the state apparatus, other than the compliance of their
actions with the terms of legislation. Persons may use the law, as if
it were a facility, but they cannot directly make the law. The task
of making law is a state monopoly. In the structure of public life,
therefore, persons are inert entities.35 Judgment, however, ener-
gizes persons. If sovereignty is enforcement, the ultimate criterion
of law is judgment, not legislative or individual calculation. The
sovereign makes law by reference to and with the aid of persons11
The enforcing power, like a common law court, looks to the plead-
ings of parties as the first step in its determination of judgment.
Indeed, the participation of private persons in enforcement is in
itself a distribution to or sharing of sovereignty with private per-
sons. When sovereignty is le'islation, no such distribution is
possible.17
C. Anti-Positivism, Contract and Distributing Sovereignty
Through Associations
The insignificance of persons in the public life of modern posi-
tivism has struck many as a factor to be weighed against the doc-
trine of sovereignty." These critics of modern positivism abhor a
system in which the sole effective source of order is the state appa-
ratus. Society, they reflect, is abundant with spontaneous arrange-
ments among persons, formed without the state's aid and enabling
authority. Persons are the source of energy and order in the econ-
omy and in cultural life. Sovereignty, when used, is but a pretext
to suppress and control the energy of persons. The state apparatus,
they argue, exists only to remedy occasional defects in the autono-
mous order of society. It is a committee of the private world, a
35. See, e.g., J. BENTHAm, The Constitutional Code ("Means of Government"), in 9
THE WORKS OF JERMY BENTHAm 95-96 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). To put government, that is,
legislation, in the hands of an ordinary member of society is to invite partiality in a subject
where attention to universal intereit is required. Cf. J. BENTHAM, A Fragment on Govern-
ment, in A BETrimA REsanm 53-54 (M. Mack ed. 1969).
36. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 95, 131, 135, 149.
37. Original positivists forbade the distribution of legislative power outside the state
apparatus, even as they suppressed its role inside. See J. LocKE, supra note 19, at § 141.
38. See, e.g., F. HAYEK I, supra note 9, at 91-93; F. HAYEK H, supra note 9, at 71-84.
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negligible extension of other less visible means in society for curing
the disorders of spontaneous order. 9
Law, to these anti-positivists, is neither legislation nor en-
forcement. It is the ratification or restoration of spontaneous ar-
rangements. 40 Law gives peremptory form to a content voluntarily
supplied by those subject to law. It forces, or threatens to force,
only what persons agree shall be forced. The principles of law,
therefore, are coterminous with the principles of contract. Sponta-
neous order makes up the lack of an objective criterion, which had
led to the doctrine of sovereignty in the first place. Contract avoids
the necessity of sovereignty. 1
Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart reacted to the attack of anti-
positivists by seeking to accomodate contract within the doctrine
of sovereignty.42 Both derive contract as a distribution of legisla-
tive, or rule-making power to private persons outside the state ap-
paratus. Parties to a contract "legislate" the rule by which the sov-
ereign commands them. The anti-positivists thus forced modem
positivists, for the first time, to grant private persons a creative
role in public life beyond the sterile role as electors they had been
assigned in nineteenth century representative democracy.
Neither version of contract, as reflection of spontaneous order
or as the distribution of rule-making power to private persons, ade-
quately accounts for the reality of associations. Unless we distort
the ordinary principles of contract beyond recognition, contract
cannot accomplish the shifting of legal responsibility that marks
an association. Even omitting the third term of person, which is
39. The anti-positivist need not be politically conservative. A notion of autonomous
social order appears, for example, in the work of K. Marx. See, e.g., S. AvIMs, THE SociAL
AND POLTIcAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARx 86-95 (1968).
40. See, e.g., F. HAYEK I, supra note 9, at 94-123.
41. To describe the constructions of Locke and Hobbes as "contract theory" is techni-
cally improper. Both account for political society through the legal device of agency, not
contract: the sovereign is agent of the persons forming the commonwealth. See T. HoBBns,
supra note 7, at 132; J. LOCKE, supra note 19, at § 89. Contra H. WARRENDER, THE PoLm-
CAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (1957) (Warrender finds a pre-existing covenant in the state of
nature.). Hobbes says: "This [the formation of the Commonwealth] is more than Consent
... ." T. HOBBES, supra note 7, at 131. We see the spectacle in original positivism, which
modern positivists and anti-positivists have found difficult to abide, of an agent command-
ing his principal. Yet this grasps the truth of authority, hence government, more completely
than less paradoxical formulations. See generally H. PmKIN, Tim CONCEPT OF REPRESENTA-
TION 1-37, 209-40 (1967).
42. See note 18 supra. The details of their attempts at accommodation, though impor-
tant in the jurisprudence of the past generation, are beyond the scope of this Article.
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judgment, contract neither shifts the attribution of action among
persons, nor alters the binding consequence of action thus attrib-
uted. Contract leaves unchanged the legal responsibility of persons
who are parties to the contract. The terms of contract, it is true,-
may accomplish a private redistribution of benefits and harms, but
they do not change the unit of account according to which the ben-
efits and harms are distributed. Thus, a contract may call for one
party to make the other whole, when a stranger to the contract
presses a claim against him. But the principles of contract cannot
force the stranger, without his -consent, to absolve from liability the
person he would otherwise attempt to bind.43 Binding consequence
stays where the law puts it, even if the person bound is subse-
quently made whole by operation of terms of the contract. Also,
action that is attributed to one person by law is not then attrib-
uted to another, simply because it is taken pursuant to a contract.
The attribution of action is unaffected, even if the contract terms
give all the benefits of the action to the other party. Contract fails
to shift legal responsibility and thus cannot alone construct
associations.
One must return to original positivism, to sovereignty as en-
forcement, to find an adequate account of shifting legal responsi-
bility, hence associations." So long as one fixes on legislation, as do
anti-positivists and modem positivists, the unique reality of as-
sociations in our legal culture eludes one's grasp. The enmity be-
tween spontaneous order and legislation is an illusion, caused by
insufficient attention to the struggle of the original positivists to
keep legislation and spontaneous order in productive tension. If
they are kept apart, the whole of the private world seems to be
constructed on the principles of contract, which it is not. The sepa-
rate principle of associations appears directly as one restores the
productive tension of original positivism. To understand associa-
tions, one must draw together the power of the state to declare
43. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTACrs § 160(4) (1932).
44. When American Realists examined the uncertain fate of rules in enforcement, they
asserted no more than Locke would against an ardent Benthamite. Some allowed their criti-
cism of modem positivism to push them into the camp of anti-positivists. Others retained a
faith in the social necessity of authority, reworking sovereignty to approximate the system
of state and society in original positivism. Thus, they would consider legislation that works
without the intervention of an enforcement authority to be self-enforcement by those who
obey the legislation. See, e.g., H. HAnT & A. SACKS, supra note 16, at 132-33. Cf. note 19
supra.
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rules and the energy of persons both to use rules and contribute to
their construction.45 One should not assume that declaring, using,
and enforcing rules are separate, even when the institutional struc-
ture of the state apparatus seems to require it. 46 The case of as-
sociations compels that these fragments of sovereignty be joined.
When sovereignty is restored to enforcement, 47 persons play a
role in public life more prominent than the one accorded them by
Kelsen or Hart. As recipients of authority to enforce, persons do
more than make contracts: they enter into associations. Conse-
quently, the most rudimentary association, the fiduciary relation,
is a primary distribution of complete enforcement power to private
persons.
II. FDucIARy RELATIONS: THE KERNEL OF ASSOCIATIONS
The claim is that the broad class of fiduciary relations insinu-
ates public sovereignty into private life in the form of associations.
Where it appears, the fiduciary relation marks a primary distribu-
tion of sovereignty to persons outside the state apparatus. It forms,
as well, the most rudimentary instance of association. More com-
plex associations are built upon the fiduciary relation by successive
modifications of its elemental structure.
The structure of the fiduciary relation may be described as a
shifting of judgment from one person to another. The shifting, not
45. Cf. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HAnv. L. Rav. 637 (1976). When sovereignty is considered enforcement,
then contract appears, not as a delegation of rulemaking power to private persons, but the
use of expectations of enforcement in private negotiations. A contract is the exchange of
expectations, whose validity is established by the willingness of the state apparatus to en-
sure that its terms are fulfilled. The sovereign undertakes to enforce terms created by pri-
vate persons coming to agreement. The content of enforcement is thus determined by per-
sons outside the state apparatus. Nonetheless, the act of enforcement itself is jealously
guarded by the sovereign. Private persons dictate the contents of enforcement, but they are
neither given, nor do they take to themselves any portion of the enforcement mechanism
itself. Using expectations of enforcement in private negotiations is not a complete distribu-
tion of enforcement. It neglects to plant the mechanism of enforcement alongside the power
to determine its content. Associations make good this neglect.
46. The theoretical premise of this Article has been applied in the field of constitu-
tional law by Professor Lawrenc6 G. Sager. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HIv. L. Rv. 1212 (1978).
47. The legal and philosophic literature contains several recent proposals for distribut-
ing enforcement in toto to private persons. Private Alternatives to the Judicial Process,
(Proceedings of a Seminar Sponsored by the Liberty Fund and Administered by the Law
and Economics Center of the U. of Miami School of Law), 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1979).
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a policy of benevolence, creates concern for individual welfare in
the fiduciary relation. The persons who enter a fiduciary relation,
therefore, are essentially creatures of judgment. Fiduciary relations
are an imposition of the authority that requires all legal action to
be the product of judgment.
Furthermore, the structure of fiduciary relations impels one to
view sovereignty as judgment en masse, or enforcement. The sov-
ereign of legislation cannot take care, as it must in the fiduciary
relation, that action be prosecuted only by persons capable of exer-
cising judgment. The shifting of judgment forces the fiduciary to
exercise judgment in the affairs of another, divorced from personal
interest. His exercise of judgment apart from interest admits the
fiduciary into the enforcement power of the sovereign.
Finally, the shifting of judgment brings with it an initial shift-
ing of legal responsibility, hence an association of fiduciary with
beneficiary.
A. Fiduciary Relations as a Shifting of Judgment
Anglo-American law has a plethora of relations whose charac-
ter it calls "fiduciary. ' 48 The relation of trustee to trust beneficiary
is only the most prominent.49 Agent and principal,50 director and
corporation,51 guardian and ward 5 -the catalogue of relations with
48. The fiduciary relation never occurs in a vacuum. It is always the character of an-
other relation. See P. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 8-12 (1977). For general accounts of the
American law of fiduciaries, see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 190-201 (1937); 1 A. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (3d ed. 1967); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
521 (1949). For other accounts, see P. FINN, supra; D. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
(1968); Sealy, The Fiduciary Relationship, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962); Shepherd, To-
wards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51 (1981); Weinrib,
The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975). But see note 53 infra.
None of these accounts, especially Shepherd's review of the premises of fiduciary obliga-
tion extant in the literature, mentions the theory of fiduciary obligation presented in this
Article: that it arises when one person voluntarily or involuntarily transfers to another per-
son his power to exercise judgment.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 170, Comment a, subsection (1) (1959); 2
A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (3d ed. 1967).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 140 (1964). The English authorities are not explicit on the fiduciary char-
acter of agents though they in fact impose it. See R. POWELL, THE LAW OF AGENCY 246-48,
252 (1952) ("Any agent who consents to act for principal owes a duty of care to his principal
.... 13).
51. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 190, Comment a (1937); 2 H. OLECK, MODERN
CORPORTION LAW § 959 (1959).
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a fiduciary character is huge and various. Since the name "fiduci-
ary" has been applied to such different relations, the fiduciary
character either does not exist, or is so simple and indeterminate
that it can be adapted to each empirical circumstance.5 3
Such accounts of the fiduciary relation as appear in standard
texts are simple. "A fiduciary relationship," Professor Scott writes,
"involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for the benefit
of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of
the relation.""' The texts speak, and in this they are joined by in-
numerable cases, as if one could comprehend the fiduciary relation
entirely as one person acting for the benefit, or protecting the in-
terest of another.5 Indeed, the occasions upon which the law will
find a fiduciary relation support the standard account. A principal
authorizes an agent to do what he will not or can not do himself.
The trustee manages a stock that the settlor of the trust does not
wish the trust beneficiary to manage. In general, the fiduciary rela-
tion arises when one person loses or resigns56 the capacity to pro-
52. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTTUTON § 190, Comment a; 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward §
3 (1976).
53. See D. WATERS, supra note 48, at 241-64. It is Waters' contention that English law
has confused the remedial origin of fiduciary obligations, which is equity, with their effect
on substantive legal relations. The result has been a poverty of analytical thinking about
fiduciary relations, leaving each case to be determined as fact without the aid of legal prece-
dent. Pointing to the work of Seavey and Scott, Waters does not find an equivalent poverty
in America. The remedy enters substantive law, as in the thesis of this Article.
54. 1 A. ScoTt, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 39.
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 170; G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUTvEs § 541 (2d rev. ed. 1978); P. FaNN, supra note 48, at 9-10; Shepherd, supra
note 48, at 75.
56. "Loses" and "resigns" mask or simplify an issue one confronts often in a systematic
discussion of associations. In the narrow context of fiduciary relations the issue is whether
fiduciary obligation is "imposed on" or "undertaken by" persons. The more general issue is
whether associations must include elements, such as sovereignty, that cannot be understood
adequately in terms of contract. Are all relations persons enter by consent just contract
relations? The short answer is, no. Not every voluntary or consensual relation can be or is in
fact reduced to contract. Marriage, for example, though it is voluntary, requires the overt
intervention of public authority. Even formally contractual relations may contain non-con-
tractual elements. The professional relation of physician to patient is created by contract,
but generally governed by the tort of negligence. Many states do not allow contracting par-
ties to limit liability for negligence in the performance of contracts, or, in some states, cer-
tain classes of contracts. Section 1-102(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes the
obligation of good faith, reasonableness, diligence and care on contracting parties, which
they may not disclaim. Contract theorists, to be sure, have attempted to rework all private
obligation as contract, express or implied. Tort, property, marriage, and association are, in
this view, just branches of the law of contracts. Yet Anglo-American practice has never fully,
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vide for his own benefit, to protect his own interest.5 7 The texts, in
their focus on benefit or interest, seem adequately to reflect legal
doctrine.
Yet to pose the point at which the fiduciary relation attaches
as a loss or resignation of protection of interest is to look at the
matter entirely from the point of view of persons. Doctrine is loath
to give "benefit" or "interest" a meaning beyond what each person
would give it. Where an economist would say, "People pursue their
interests," the lawyer would remark only that what persons do be-
yond the specific undertakings and constraints of law is their own
business. For the purposes of doctrine it is a truism that people
pursue their interests. Lawyers care only when persons perform
certain legally significant actions. "Benefit," or "interest," means
only that persons are free to do as they please, and has no assertive
content. 5
How can it be said, then, that a person has resigned the pro-
tection of his interest? Can it mean that the person has resigned
the ability to do as he would please? But the ordinary person is
forever in the position of not being able to do as he would please,
and doctrine does not give the ordinary person the benefit of
fiduciary obligations. The resignation of the protection of interest
must mean something more than the perspective of persons gives
it.
If the resignation is to have legal significance, it must effect
actions or conditions with which the law concerns itself. A person's
protection of his interest is significant in law only when the inter-
or even mostly, bent to the view that contract is the proper form of all private obligation.
When one enters a relation with a fiduciary character, one buys a package whose contents
one cannot entirely control. Yet one has committed the voluntary act of buying the package.
See text accompanying notes 9-10, 16, 38-43 supra; notes 75-76, 83-89, 90-91 infra. See P.
FINN, supra note 48, at 9, 12-13; Shepherd, supra note 48, at 64-68, 75-79. Henceforth, the
complex meaning contained in the phrase "loses or resigns" will be indicated by the single
word "resigns."
57. The loss or resignation need not encompass the whole of the person. The precise
extent of loss or resignation defines the reach of the fiduciary obligation. Thus a partner has
a fiduciary obligation to his partners only with respect to the business of the partnership.
Several fiduciary relations, such as ward and guardian, extend over the totality of the person
of the beneficiary, even beyond what law otherwise includes in its definition of person, as in
the occasion one cares for an incompetent or provides for the education of an infant.
58. Professor Finn, in the only comprehensive treatise our tradition possesses on fiduci-
ary obligations, calls the freedom to pursue interest "independence," or "autonomy." P.
FINN, supra note 48, at 13, 21-23.
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est he defines or the manner in which he pursues it qualify as ac-
tion entailing a binding consequence attributable to the person.
Law is concerned with benefit or interest as the source of attrib-
uted action.
From the perspective of the legal system, then, resignation of
the protection of one's interest signifies only resignation of the
ability to adjust attributed action in terms of its binding conse-
quence. If a person loses the ability to adjust his actions, then law
will have lost the whole of its effectiveness as a system of control,
and fully half its pretension to justice, since by correcting the
wrong to the innocent suitor it creates a fresh wrong against the
innocent sued. Law cannot tolerate actions taken, where the one to
whom the action would be attributed is unable either to judge the
binding consequence of the action or implement his judgment.
Resignation of the protection of interest is, therefore, from the per-
spective of law and not the person, a resignation of judgment.
By itself, resignation of protection by one entails no assign-
ment of protection to another. Though it may appear in a given
instance that protection is assigned in the moment it is lost, the
theory of benefit, or interests, does not compel it. Law may speak
of solicitude for beneficiaries, if only to justify its interference in
the private ordering of affairs, yet it neglects this solicitude when
only the interest of a person is at stake. Fiduciary relations, how-
ever, require both steps: resignation of protection and its
assignment.
If, for a second time, one adopts the perspective of the legal
system instead of the perspective of single persons, then the impe-
tus behind the assignment of resigned protection becomes clear. If
the resignation is one of judgment, rendering the person unable
either to assess the binding consequence of action or to take action
in light of the assessment, the legal system faces an unpalatable
choice: whether or not to leave the person without judgment re-
sponsible for actions that are not the product of his judgment. Our
legal system thematically chooses not to hold a person without
judgment responsible for his legally significant actions, for to do so
would vitiate the purposes of judgment: to make law a system of
control, and to appeal to the sense of justice. But if the legal sys-
tem neglects to hold such a person responsible, it is in the anoma-
lous position of allowing attributed action without a binding conse-
quence. This too is intolerable. Consequently, the law deprives the
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person without judgment of the capacity to act, and assigns the
burden of acting on his behalf to another person. This other per-
son, the fiduciary, is considered to possess the judgment lacking in
the first. Action and forbearance are attributed to him, and he
must suffer their binding consequence.
As confirmation of the hypothesis that judgment is the subject
of fiduciary relations, one may observe that the obligation arising
from a transfer of judgment may or may not entail a prohibition
upon the beneficiary resuming his protection, or taking responsibil-
ity once again for the exercise of judgment. Certainly in agency,
where the agent bears a fiduciary obligation towards his principal,
there is no prohibition against the principal performing tasks as-
signed to his agent.59 The trust beneficiary, however, generally may
not assume the management of trust property, even for a mo-
ment.60 Though the matter requires careful scrutiny, the distinc-
tion between instances where a beneficiary is and is not allowed to
resume judgment may be based upon his ability to do so. If the
beneficiary truly lacks judgment, so that he cannot be restored to
it, then the law would not allow him to resume his own protection.
But if he lacks judgment only because he has placed himself in a
position where it is impossible to exercise it, as does the settlor of a
revocable trust, then he could be restored to judgment when he
takes himself out of that position.
The structure of the fiduciary relation, therefore, is shaped by
the shifting of judgment from one person to another. Benevolence
to the beneficiary is a result of the shifting of judgment. Fiduciary
relations are imposed by the authority that requires all legal action
to be the product of judgment.
59. Unless the principal has contracted with his agent not to interfere. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 434; W. SEAvEY, supra note 50, at § 165.
60. Cf. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OP TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 297 (2d ed. 1978). The trust
case is quite complex, as befits an advanced form of association in which the fiduciary char-
acter is only one element. See Part V, section B infra. A trust, where trust beneficiary gets
control over actions of the trustee, more nearly resembles an agency. In the classic family
trust, which a settlor creates to care for an infant, the trust beneficiary can have no control
over the trustee. In either case, the trust beneficiary would normally not directly manage the
trust res, leaving that to the trustee. The complexity of the trust case derives from the fact
that the settlor, not public authority, determines the precise relationship of trust beneficiary




B. Fiduciary Relations as a Distribution of Sovereignty
The discussion of fiduciary obligation has from the beginning
implicated sovereignty. The law shifts judgment, it is claimed,
more to protect the interests of the legal system, holding responsi-
ble only those who can be responsible, than to enhance the welfare
of the helpless beneficiary, even though law prefers to speak of the
matter as benevolence. The facts, however, do not sustain this in-
terpretation. The irruption of fiduciary obligations into private af-
fairs protects the interest and stability of the legal system. Even
so, the public law interpretation of fiduciary relations would hardly
be convincing, unless it could demonstrate that the interests of the
legal system contribute decisively to the structure of fiduciary rela-
tions. This demonstration reveals, in turn, the nature of sover-
eignty as enforcement and the participation of fiduciaries in
enforcement.
When judgment shifts, it changes. The fiduciary's judgment
serves the legal system first, and the beneficiary second. This
transformation occurs for two reasons, of which the second is more
important.
First, the fiduciary could hardly know what actions to take in
order to protect the interest of his beneficiary simply by consulting
his own conception of interest, and it would be useless to consult
the beneficiary, since the premise of the relation is that the benefi-
ciary has lost or resigned his power to be consulted. The law treats
a person protecting his own interest as one who necessarily exer-
cises judgment at once defining his interest and deciding the best
way to protect it. It is essential to our concept of person that the
interest protected be the person's own. Otherwise, judgment is un-
reliable. It is not simply that one person will not look out for an-
other's interest (the assumption that he will not cannot in practice
be maintained): even the most zealous protection of another's in-
terest is foiled by the impossibility of one person defining interest
for another person. To do so would violate the person of the other,
which requires that he define his own interest. Fiduciary relations
contemplate precisely what the person abhors: interest protected
by another. For this reason alone, the interest protected by the
fiduciary must not be the interest of the beneficiary, but rather an
interest imputed to him by public authority. Only thus can the
person of the beneficiary survive in the fiduciary relation, even if it
survives only as a fiction.
1980]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The second reason why shifting judgment transmutes it fol-
lows immediately upon the first. The fiduciary protects an interest
imputed to the beneficiary by public authority. He lies accountable
to the public authority for protecting the imputed interest. He is
not free to define and protect the interest of the other as he is free
to define and protect his own. What may be witnessed in fiduciary
relations is the creation of a second personality in the fiduciary: it
is a public personality, for which he serves as incidental holder,
rather than augmentation of his own private personality. The in-
terest protected by the fiduciary, the judgment he exercises and
executes, is thus the interest that belongs to his second, public per-
sonality. Both beneficiary and fiduciary lose the right of private
judgment, of idiosyncratic benefit. The beneficiary must accept the
judgment following upon imputed interest, and the fiduciary must
prosecute it.
These simple considerations reveal that public authority in-
trudes in private affairs through the very structure of the fiduciary
relation. The interest forming the subject of the relation is an in-
terest belonging to neither participant, but is imputed by public
authority, and the judgment to be exercised is a judgment foreign
to both beneficiary and fiduciary, absent public authority. Yet, one
may show more than that public authority intrudes into private
affairs. By examining the content of the imputed interest, it is pos-
sible to demonstrate that the fiduciary is given and exercises a por-
tion of sovereignty, construed as enforcement.
The fiduciary is burdened with two obligations, based on the
imputed interest he must protect. The first is the obligation of loy-
alty, a prohibition against the fiduciary taking his own interest into
account when he prosecutes the interest imputed by public author-
ity. For example, the obligation of loyalty forbids the fiduciary to
undertake any action that affects the distribution to him of bene-
fits or harms. 1
The second obligation is at once one that ought to infuse the
fiduciary's action and a standard by which it is judged. The fiduci-
ary is admonished to conduct the affairs of the beneficiary that are
within his power as a reasonably prudeit man would conduct his
own affairs. The admonition speaks as if the fiduciary ought to put




himself in the mind of a person of a certain temper conducting his
affairs. Its language preserves the pretense that caring for another,
which in reality is the task of the fiduciary, is the ordinary action
of a single person prosecuting his own interest.
But the single person of the fiduciary relation may not prose-
cute his interest as he pleases: he must be reasonably prudent 2 To
be prudent is to treat oneself as another in one's charge. By elabo-
rate circumlocution, preserving the pretense of -single persons,
fiduciary relations call upon one to exercise reasonable care for an-
other. Even when it is admitted, however, that fiduciary relations
require caring for another, the pretense of single persons may be
and ordinarily is preserved. Those whose duty it is to maintain and
develop the Anglo-American legal tradition show considerable re-
luctance in according significance to an attitude or temper, such as
caring for another.63 Their hope in any circumstance where an atti-
tude or temper is at issue is to find an objective correlative by
which the presence or absence of the temper might definitively be
ascertained. Then temper itself would be eliminated from consid-
eration, since it is replaced by a search for the objective correla-
tive. Thus, for example, wanton disregard or recklessness is usually
determined from an examination of the actual behavior of the one
charged with that temper. The temper is inferred from actual be-
havior, and not examined in its own right. By charging a defendant
with wanton disregard or recklessness one does not, in fact, accuse
him of possessing a certain temper, but rather of having behaved
in a way that common experience would attribute to that temper."
Similarly, the hope of those responsible for its administration
is that the temper of the fiduciary relation be reduced to objective
correlatives that would, as a matter of law, eliminate temper from
the relation. Caring for another, like other standards, could then
be enforced by examining the actual behavior of the fiduciary, re-
gardless of his temper in dealing with the beneficiary. If the fiduci-
ary relation is reduced from a temper of one person towards an-
62. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 174; 2 A. Sco'rr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
174.
63. See Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in the Fourteenth Century
Law of Torts, 128 U. PmN. L. Rzv. 361, 374-78 (1979).
64. See 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 107-13 (1881). Cf. Cook, Act, Intention, and
Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 644 (1917); Fuller, Human Interaction in the
Law, 14 AM. J. Jums. 1, 34 (1969).
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other to the actual behavior of a single person, then law will have
rid itself of the one relation that intensely threatens its preference
for dealing with single persons.
The push to reduce the subjective temper of caring to objec-
tive standards, thus to preserve the preference for single persons,
has succeeded in several varieties of fiduciary relation, where the
legal and business contexts will bear it.05 Nevertheless, the guardi-
ans of law have not been able to eradicate the subjective element
in fiduciary relations, for two reasons.
First, many legal and business contexts in which fiduciary re-
lations are found simply will not bear formulation through stan-
dards. The common law response to being unable to formulate
standards, throwing the determination to a jury, only exacerbates
the problem, since juries must be instructed and their verdicts con-
trolled. Moreover, many fiduciary relations are regulated by pro-
ceedings in which juries are not used for fact-finding, such as eq-
uity. The fact-finding judge must reason his way through evidence
without the benefit of objective standards. Second, even when ob-
jective standards have been formulated, the strong sense remains
that the faithless fiduciary has committed a subjective violation,
not simply that his behavior retrospectively constitutes a breach of
objective standards. The faithless fiduciary has failed in a trust; he
has breached a fiduciary obligation. The ordinary citizen, for the
most part, accepts the preference of his legal guardians for think-
ing about wrongs as the breach of objective standards. Thus, the
community today does not necessarily consider a breacher of con-
tracts or perpetrator of negligence to be bad, but one who in retro-
spect has breached a standard and must pay for it. Even where
attitude forms an element of a tort, such as assault, the stigma of
evil temper may be erased by paying punitive damages.
Neither the ordinary citizen, nor his legal guardians, have en-
tirely accomplished or accepted the reduction of the fiduciary tem-
per of care to objective standards. A clear residuum of attitude or
temper governs all consideration of fiduciary relations. The fiduci-
ary relation is unique in its resistance to the blandishments of ob-
jectivity. It has resisted for two reasons.
65. Cf. D. WATERS, supra note 48, at 258-64. See generally R. Niles, A Contemporary
View of Liability for Breach of Trust (The Fifth Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture deliv-
ered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1974).
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First, objective standards suffice, coupled with retrospective
judgment and compensation, only because the legal system as-
sumes the ability and desire of the wronged person to bring his
injury to the attention of the authorities, who will correct it. If the
wronged person is either unable or unwilling to do so, out of igno-
rance, fear, or other circumstances considered unacceptable in our
legal system, then the assumption breaks down, and objective stan-
dards, coupled with retrospective compensation, cease adequately
to perform the task of ensuring justice in private transactions. But
our legal system finds fiduciary relations in precisely those circum-
stances where the wronged person would be either unable or un-
willing to apprise the authorities. The temper of the person en-
trusted with a fiduciary obligation is then critical and irreducible,
since protection of the beneficiary's interest is given to a person
who is likely to be the only one either to know that the beneficiary
has been wronged or to do something about it. If the attitude of
the fiduciary is adverse to the interest of his beneficiary, the entire
structure of shifting protection of interest must collapse, unaided
by the salutary operation of objective standards and retrospective
compensation.
The temper of care the law requires of a fiduciary may be
compared to the duty of care ordinary persons owe, one to another,
the breach of which constitutes an element of the tort of negli-
gence. The care in' negligence is hardly an attitude or temper. The
duty of care tends to be owed not to a given individual, but to
broad classes of persons in similar circumstances. Yet the temper
of care that should possess a fiduciary is directed towards a partic-
ular person, who means more to the fiduciary than a nexus of cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, law has no interest in the attitude or
temper of the one who owes the duty of care. It is simply an objec-
tive standard, a judgment of offending behavior after it has oc-
curred, that awards compensation and renders justice retrospec-
tively between tortfeasor and victim. Even more to the point, law
does not punish a breach of the duty of care unless it results in
injury. There is no "negligence in the air." 6 One is free to be negli-
gent so long as one is willing to assume the risk of injury. Yet the
law does take what care it can to ensure that the fiduciary acts in
the preferred temper. It does, for example, as part of the duty of
66. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928).
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loyalty, forbid the fiduciary, as a general rule, from trading in the
subject matter of the relation, so that his judgment, his temper of
care, will not be clouded by self interest.67
The almost unique interest shown by law and common opinion
in the temper of the fiduciary, in the prospect, of misdeed rather
than in the retrospective correction of it by compensation, calls to
mind the condition of a public official. No one cares to know that
the malfeasant official can one day be brought to account. Retro-
spective justice is not the coin in which government and adminis-
tration commend themselves to legitimacy.8 In the ideology of the
Anglo-American system, trust and caring for the public business
are the measures of qualification for office. The rationale of public
life does not include resort to the protection of litigation as a suffi-
cient or desirable method of controlling official behavior. Much
greater stock is put in the careful selection of trustworthy person-
nel. Indeed, the temper of the official who conducts it is perhaps
the most telling recommendation of legitimacy for a course of
action.
The family resemblance of fiduciary relations to public office
raises the second reason why the temper of care in fiduciary rela-
tions does not give way entirely to the formulation of objective
standards and the rendering of retrospective compensation on the
basis of those standards. The public authority relies on the fiduci-
ary to exercise judgment on behalf of his beneficiary and to imple-
ment the judgment. Just as the public authority creates contract
through its willingness to enforce promises,69 it creates fiduciary
relations by its decision to care for the interests of one who has
lost or resigned the capacity for judgment in the prosecution of his
affairs. The reason of state for this decision may, in fact, be the
preference of the public authority that action be taken only by one
who can be accountable for action. The private consequence of the
decision is that the state undertakes responsibility for the welfare
of certain of its citizens. The fiduciary plays a crucial role in the
undertaking, for it is to him that the public authority delegates the
initial responsibility of putting into operation, thus executing or
enforcing, a decision of the state. He may no more be held to the
67. Qualifications to this statement are set forth in 2 A. ScowT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§
170.10, 170.12.
68. See, e.g., J. LocKE, supra note 19, at §§ 136, 161-64.
69. See note 45 supra.
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test of objective standards than the ordinary public official, vast
areas of whose activities must be judged prospectively according to
the temper of selfless loyalty and competence, not retrospectively
in a restricting attempt to construct objective standards. The pub-
lic official and the fiduciary have in common that they must be free
to exercise competence, lest either be rendered incapable of prose-
cuting the business entrusted to him. The fiduciary oughi to be in
no different position vis-a-vis public authority than a subordinate
official: he is entrusted with a task by the enforcing authority, to
whom he must eventually account in terms that go beyond objec-
tive standards.7 0
The fiduciary relation, then, is the private law structure that is
formed when the sovereign as enforcer delegates the task of caring
for the substantive welfare of certain persons to other persons who
are in an especially favorable position to assume the delegation. It
is a matter of efficiency. The state would not perform the task it-
self. In the first place, it is not equipped to do so. In the second,
numerous and powerful voices in our tradition stand by the pro-
position that the state ought not to be involved in caring for the
substantive welfare of its citizens.71 If private persons can be en-
listed to do the job, then the state will have accomplished its goal
without offending a cherished self-image. The law can perform
many tasks in the disguise of justice that would not be tolerated as
naked policy. Fiduciary obligations present just such a task. And
finally, who better than the direct source of threat to the welfare of
a citizen may be enlisted to protect it?
C. Fiduciary Relations as Associations
To conclude the discussion of fiduciary relations, it is well to
consider the paucity of changes they engender in the subordinate
elements of person: Attribution of action and binding consequence
that flows from the attribution of action.
Here the multiplicity of fiduciary relations would seem to pose
an acute problem. So far, one could account for differences among
fiduciary relations by reference either to the thoroughness with
which the beneficiary is deprived of judgment, or to the amenabil-
70. Professor Finn sees the resemblance of fiduciary relation to office as a central, the-
matic character of fiduciary obligation. See P. FINN, supra note 48, at 3, 8-14.
71. See, e.g., 2 F. HAYK, LAw, LGILATION AND LmERTY (1976).
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ity of the fiduciary's obligation to formulation in objective stan-
dards. These are differences of degree, not kind. But differences of
kind appear in the subordinate elements of person. For example, in
certain relations possessing a fiduciary character the beneficiary is
not personally bound by actions of his fiduciary, beyond their ef-
fect on property of the beneficiary.72 Yet in the relation between
principal and agent, the principal, as beneficiary, is bound by the
authorized actions of his agent, who is a fiduciary. 3 Agency, as a
subset of fiduciary relations, marks a second stage in the construc-
tion of associations. Agency is a fiduciary relation altered by the
addition of one or more qualities to the primitive fiduciary charac-
ter. The difference in shifting of accounts between primitive fiduci-
ary relation and agency may be characterized as a progress from
simpler to more complex associations. Consequently, the set of
primitive fiduciary relations displays a uniform shifting of accounts
differing only from the shifting of accounts in higher forms of asso-
ciation, such as agency. The multiplicity of fiduciary relations in
the shifting of accounts is thus only apparent.
Where the primitive fiduciary relation is found, the fiduciary
has the right to take action affecting the property (and actions or
fate) of the beneficiary. Contract also acknowledges this right, as,
for example, in a contract for construction on land. However, the
decision how to affect property in contract is a mutual decision,
taken prior to initiation of the action. In fiduciary relations, the
decision is taken by fiduciary alone (in concert with oversight by
the public authority) after setting terms in the relation. Fiduciary
relations thus depart from a settled presumption of our law, that
one may not affect another's property without the explicit, prior,
and specific permission of the other. 4 The parameters within
which the fiduciary has a license to affect property of his benefi-
ciary are determined by many factors, peculiar to the setting of
each fiduciary relation. Among the most prominent is, for example,
whether title to the property has been vested in the fiduciary or
remains in the beneficiary.
Actions of the fiduciary do not personally bind the beneficiary,
though they affect property of his subject to the relation. Thus ac-
72. In the trust, for example. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 274.
73. See note 78 infra.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 158, 217 (1965).
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tions of the fiduciary are not attributed to the beneficiary, though
taken at the instance of his protection. Yet, the fiduciary is bound
as a private person by his actions as fiduciary. The fiduciary rela-
tion provides no insulation between the public personality created
in the fiduciary and his private personality. This contrasts sharply
with more advanced forms of association, in which insulation is
provided between the private personality of the participant and
the personality created by his participation. In the primitive
fiduciary relation, the fiduciary can look to no one for the legal
consequences of his actions as fiduciary. He cannot look to the
public authority, which regulates him, and certainly not to the
beneficiary, for whose benefit, but not in whose name, the fiduciary
acts. The fiduciary is subjected to personal liability to fulfill the
enforcement vision of person: that one who exercises judgment be
responsible for its consequence.
The primitive fiduciary relation provides the scarcest begin-
ning in the shifting of the elements of person. The fiduciary is li-
censed to affect property of the beneficiary in limited ways, but
cannot, for example, affect transfer of title in the property, unless
title has first been transferred to him, as in the trust. The fiduciary
is bound by actions he takes to affect the property, as if they were
taken to affect property of his own. The beneficiary must suffer the
consequences of the fiduciary's actions, but only to the extent of
property subject to the relation. He is not personally bound. The
first step in the construction of associations out of sovereignty en-
tails nothing more than one person acting to affect the interest of
another, and being bound as if he were acting on his own account.
III. AGENCY: THE ARROGATION OF AUTHORITY
Fiduciary relations are the material from which all associa-
tions are constructed. They provide the foundation for a sequence
unique in our law, running from fiduciary relations to agency, part-
nership, joint stock companies, trusts, and corporations. So agency
is constructed from the primitive fiduciary character by its fusion
with a novel quality; partnership is similarly constructed from
agency, and so on. 5
75. The temporal priority of elements in the sequence has no necessary bearing on its
logical order. Agency precedes partnership in logic, but not necessarily in time. The se-
quence is the picture of a single moment, the middle part of the twentieth century, which
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Fiduciary relations must be credited with two accomplish-
ments. First, they are the vehicle by which a portion of sovereignty
is distributed to private persons. Second, they constitute the most
rudimentary association, licensing one person to affect the interest
of another person, who is forbidden, because he is incapable, to
affect them on his own.
Yet fiduciary relations leave much to be accomplished in con-
structing associations. They fail to treat the beneficiary as a person
necessarily active in the relation. Nor do they impose themselves
on strangers to the relation (except to nullify their dealings with
the beneficiary, which could be premised on other grounds, such as
infancy). They fail to shift either subordinate element in the per-
son: attribution of action, or binding consequence. They have no
attribute forming an interior of the association, such as association
property, or methods of group decision. All these remain to be ac-
complished in higher forms of association.
These matters can be accomplished only when both partici-
pants in the rudimentary association take into their hands the por-
tion of sovereignty distributed in primitive fiduciary relations to
only one of them. Fiduciary obligation (if not the relation from
which the obligation is said to arise) is thrust upon private persons
to serve a purpose of the state apparatus.76 In order for fiduciary
relations to flower into forms of association exhibiting the omitted
matters, private persons, beneficiaries in particular, must bend
them to their own purposes. The private world must capture the
fiduciary relation, transforming it into an economic facility.
Agency, as a fiduciary relation in which both participants exercise
a portion of sovereignty, is the vehicle of capture.7
Even as private persons arrogate a portion of sovereignty,
however, public authority reasserts itself in fresh interventions,
making possible the evolution of higher forms of association. The
very highest association, accordingly, is the product of a series of
mutual exploitations and cooperation between state and private
possesses a broad and settled body of doctrine concerning the several associations. Yet the
history of the doctrines of association, with the exception of fiduciary relations, has now run
its course; so we are privileged to observe priority in the sequence of associations.
76. See note 56 supra.
77. Fiduciary relations, of course, may directly be used by private persons as an eco-
nomic facility. Agency, however, presents the initial formal institutional recognition that




Agency supplies three closely related attributes of association
lacking in the fiduciary relation. First, it produces a shifting of
binding consequence. Second, it requires activity from both per-
sons in the relation. Third, it imposes itself on strangers to the
relation. These three attributes are brought together in the doc-
trine of authority.
A. Contribution of Agency to the Construction of Associations
Agency is founded upon the primitive fiduciary relation, but
surpasses it in the following respect: whereas actions of the mere
fiduciary can never bind the beneficiary, the agent binds his princi-
pal if he has acted within his authority. The power to bind trans-
forms the mere fiduciary into an agent, and the beneficiary into a
principal. In general, an agent has power to bind his principal, ei-
ther in contract or tort, by taking actions authorized by the princi-
pal that bind the agent apart from his relation to the principal. 8
Thus an agent who makes a contract for his principal would also
be bound, unless he makes clear to the person wishing to bind him
that he acts for another, not himself.79 Whether he discloses the
fact of his agency or not, the agent is bound by his torts.80 Thus,
agency produces a sharing, rather than a shifting, of binding conse-
quence, both in contract and in tort.
The second attribute contributed by agency follows directly
from the first. In order to be bound by the action of his agent, the
principal must have authorized him to undertake it. He must do
precisely what a beneficiary may not do: take action, if only the
action of authorizing. But more than this, the principal retains
power to act in place of his agent. Unlike the primitive fiduciary
relation, agency does not force a principal to sacrifice any element
of his personality to obtain the benefits of the relation.81 Whereas
78. For contract, see RESTATEMENT (SE cND) OF AGENCY § 140; R. POWELL, supra note
50, at 125; W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at §§ 55-56. For tort, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 212; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 156-58; W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 91.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 320-27; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 204-
06; W. SEAvEY, supra note 50, at § 123.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 225-26;
W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 129.
81. The principal has the "right to control" the conduct of his agent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 14; W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at §
3E. If the principal exercises a high degree of control over his agent, particularly his physi-
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the beneficiary of a fiduciary obligation is barred from acting pre-
cisely where it is incumbent upon the fiduciary to act, a principal
is not barred, even though he remains beneficiary of the agent. Re-
tention of personality by the principal, a beneficiary, is a paradox
in fiduciary relations, where sacrifice of personality is a prerequi-
site. Yet, it is precisely on this paradox that agency takes its stand
as a higher association. Moreover, correlating the shift of binding
consequence with retention of the power to act accords with the
thematic preference of enforcement, putting responsibility for ac-
tion on one whose judgment may be said to have caused the action.
The third attribute also follows from the first. The power to
bind makes the presence of the association legally significant to
persons outside the association. The fiduciary relation, in contrast,
has no significance to those who do not participate in it. The
fiduciary relation creates an interest distinct from the interest of
any single person. Yet, the distinct interest has no legal effect on
the outside world. Indeed, it does not appear as such to the outside
world; it is distinct only in contemplation of the participants.
Thus, the beneficiary knows that the interest protected is not
strictly his own interest, and the fiduciary knows that actions he
takes in protecting it are not strictly his own actions, but the legal
consequence of his duty to the beneficiary. The knowledge of bene-
ficiary and fiduciary does not, however, inform persons outside the
relation, and has no practical effect on them. From the perspective
of outsiders, the line between the natural personality of the fiduci-
ary and the personality he takes from the fiduciary relation is but
weakly drawn. And the beneficiary is a beneficiary precisely be-
cause either brute fact or the law has rendered him incapable of
protecting his interest and performing actions on his own. There-
fore, outsiders need not be concerned with him.
B. The Presence of Authority
Agency is the simplest instance in which an association affects
the legal relations of non-participants. The effect takes place pre-
cisely because the principal retains his power to act at the same
time his agent may perform binding actions on his behalf. If a per-
son outside deals directly with the principal, then the agency rela-
cal movements, then he is master, and the agent is a servant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220; R. PowELL, supra note 50, at 14-16; W. SEAvEY, supra note 50, at § 6A.
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tion is beside the point. The principal appears in his natural per-
sonality. It is only when a person deals with an agent in order to
bind the principal that he must be concerned with the agency rela-
tion between them. The third person wishes to bind the one by
dealing with the other. If he dealt with the agent to bind only him
and not the principal, then once again the agency relation would
be beside the point. The agency relation serves the purpose of the
principal wishing to be bound and the third person intending to
bind.
The power of an agent to bind his principal by dealing with
persons outside the relation is treated under the rubric "author-
ity. '82 Actions of an agent bind the principal only because law rec-
ognizes the authority of the agent to do so. Neither outside person
nor principal may look to each other for liability unless the person
through whom they deal, the agent, has been given the authority of
the principal. Beside fiduciary obligation and contract, agency
presents authority, a third mode of relation between persons. Two
points should be made about authority.
First, authority provides a focus for the three attributes of as-
sociation contributed by agency. Giving authority is the action a
principal must take in order to participate in the relation. It is the
channel through which binding consequence flows from agent to
principal. It is the element of the relation that makes it a reality to
outside persons. All three novel attributes emanate from authority.
Second, authority resolves the paradox agency builds into the
fiduciary relation. Authority is the substance of the fiduciary obli-
gation when the beneficiary does what he may not do by retaining
personality. In order to appreciate the role of authority in resolving
the paradox of an active beneficiary, it is necessary to examine the
special character of authority, distinguishing it, on the one hand,
from the non-associational relation of contract and, on the other,
from the primitive fiduciary relation.
The first and most striking character of authority is that in
order for it to be effective its use need not be disclosed. Thus, the
undisclosed principal may hold the outside person liable on a con-
tract made with his agent (unless the contract excludes an undis-
closed principal). Similarly, the outside person may hold the undis-
82. See RESATEmET (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 32-48; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 33-
35; W. SEAvEy, supra note 50, at § 8B.
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closed principal liable, should he discover him.83 The authority in
either case does not show itself in the negotiation between outside
person and agent. For this reason, Seavey and others have con-
cluded that authority is a principal that cannot be cabined by con-
tract.84 The contract doctrine of privity, after all, demands that lia-
bility attach only to one who is a party to the contract, either by
overt participation in the act of agreement or by formal assign-
ment according to its terms.8 5
The second distinguishing character of authority is that it
does not of necessity bind the agent to take specified actions.86 Of
course, the agent may agree to take certain actions. But, in general,
the agent is empowered, not compelled. Quite unlike contract, au-
thority retains the character of fiduciary relations, in that it may,
if the principal so desires, range over the entire ambit of his per-
sonality. Authority can command the exercise of judgment as well
as the accomplishment of certain actions. Thus, "buy potatoes if
the price falls below $10 per bushel!" is a specific command to the
agent to buy potatoes below a certain price. Yet, authority need
not command the agent to do something so specific. "Buy potatoes
if in your judgment the market will rise!" or "manage my invest-
ment in potatoes!" more nearly corresponds to what authority can
accomplish.
The fact persons can enter into a contract to manage, for ex-
ample, does not threaten this distinction. Certain contracts do ap-
pear to violate the contract prohibition against vagueness.87 By en-
tering upon a contract to manage, the party has not undertaken to
perform this or that specific act; rather, he has taken on the status
of a manager. Contract can admit one into a legal relation that is
not strictly comprehensible in contract. Thus, agency relations
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 186; R. POwELL, supra note 50, at 126-33;
W. SEAvEY, supra note 50, at §§ 62, 111-16.
84. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859 (1920). See also R, POWELL,
supra note 50, at 125; Lewis, The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contract, 9
COLUM. L. REv. 116, 135 (1909). Seavey attacks those, such as Holmes, who maintain that
rules of agency are a product of the fiction of identity between agent and principal, worked
on by common sense and policy. Holmes' vision reduces agency to contract. See Holmes,
The History of Agency, 4 HARv. L. Rzv. 345 (1891) and 5 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1891), reprinted
in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY at 368 (1909).
85. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CoRINa ON CoNTRACrS § 124 (1963). But see 6 id. § 1285.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12; R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 245-46;
W. SEAvEY, supra note 50, at § 8A. But see note 81 supra.
87. See generally 1 A. CORIN, COIIN ON CoNTACTs § 95.
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may be formed by contract, but agency itself is not contract.8
Moreover, authority can be created by any manifestation of
consent, of which contract is only one. As an empowerment, au-
thority is conferred by donation. It need not be undertaken as a
duty. The agent may accept the authority merely by using it, and
in order for the authority to be effective he need receive nothing in
return for its use.89 He is a party to the contract between an
outside person and principal only if he makes himself a party.
Authority distinguishes agency from fiduciary obligation pre-
cisely on the ground that it is created by consent. The fiduciary
relation is a product of necessity, and consent has no bearing on
whether the court institution or legal profession, generally public
authority, imposes it on the dealings of two private parties. No
person willingly and irredeemably puts himself at the mercy of an-
other, but he will often ask another to strengthen him, to act on
his behalf. In fiduciary relations the public authority intervenes in
the dealings of private persons to create an interest and require
certain actions. In agency, private persons take back into their own
hands a portion of public authority. They take it back precisely as
authority. Now they create the interest and require the actions,
not the state. Thus the principal, the beneficiary, decides what the
agent, the fiduciary, may do for him, and the agent, unless he has
bound himself by contract, decides whether he will use the author-
ity thus conferred. The fiduciary relation originates in weakness,
and marks public authority coming to the aid of a private person.
In agency the private person creates his own fiduciaries, even as he
is in a position of strength. The fiduciary relation becomes an in-
strument of private power.
C. The Appearance of Process: Inherent Authority
Resolving the paradox of agency through authority creates
what appears to be an anomaly in the effort of constructing as-
sociations. The fiduciary relation produces a separate interest, im-
posed by the public authority upon natural persons. Even so, the
separate interest of the fiduciary relation disappears in agency.
One should not have expected a higher form of association, the
agency relation, to abandon a key indicium of the created legal
88. See note 84 supra.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 15-16; W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 18.
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person, an interest apart from the interest of any natural person.
This separate interest appears in the fiduciary relation as one
ascribed to the beneficiary by public authority, only to disappear
in agency in favor of a donation of authority by one natural person
to the other participating in the relation.
It is not surprising, however, that the interest ascribed to the
beneficiary disappears in agency. The separate interest produced
in the fiduciary relation is clearly the interest of a natural person.
It makes no difference that the content of the interest is defined,
by default, in general terms. The standard of reasonable prudence
is a standard fitting natural persons. But it is inappropriate for the
conduct of affairs through advanced forms of association in a de-
centralized economy. Law cannot constrain them to the standard
of reasonable prudence. Neither can they be allowed the absolute
freedom of natural persons. The actions taken in association are
the decision of no one person, but of several members of the asso-
ciation. If the association is not to dissolve into a multitude of sin-
gle persons, then the decisions of its members must be constrained.
Yet, it is a problem how constraint may be effected, since the pub-
lic authority in Anglo-American law most often declines to deter-
mine whether a particular decision is proper.90
The solution in our law of associations is to regulate the pro-
cess of making decisions in associations higher than the fiduciary
relation, in which the content of decisions is constrained. This
statement is necessarily abstract, for the precise nature of "pro-
cess" differs from association to association. Thus "process" in
agency is not the same as process in succeeding forms of associa-
tion. Constraint becomes farther removed from content in the pro-
gress from agency to corporation.
Agency displays only the rudiments of process, and only since
the first quarter of the twentieth century. It maintains an ambiva-
lent position in the emergence of process. Agency has in it control
of the content of decisions, for the principal donates a particular
authority to his agent. But agency also controls process, which now
appears for the first time.
90. See generally R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952); 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMv AND
SocmETY 729-61 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968). In American corporate law, the reluctance
of courts to interfere in particular decisions of management is expressed in the so-called
"business judgment rule." See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631; 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926; 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (1979).
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Control of content appears first in the fiduciary relation as an
assertion of power by public authority. Control passes into private
hands in agency, the next higher form of association. One sees the
same sequence in the control of process. It appears first in agency
as an assertion of power by public authority, only to pass into pri-
vate hands in partnership. Control of process first appears in the
doctrine of inherent authority. This doctrine was recognized only
late in the history of the law of agency, when Judge Hand formally
distinguished it from apparent authority.9 1 The doctrine had been
used, but not named, as early as 1869 in Butler v. Maples.92
Apparent authority charges a principal with liability for an ac-
tion of his unauthorized agent, when conduct by the principal
causes a third person reasonably to believe that the agent pos-
sesses authority for the action.93 Apparent authority is premised on
the dual character of authority, that it creates a relation not only
between agent and principal, but also between those two and the
outside world. The principal creates apparent authority.
Yet in certain cases courts hold a principal liable for the unau-
thorized action of his agent even when the principal has done
nothing to create the appearance of authority, indeed, when the
agent has acted contrary to instructions. The fault of the principal
in these cases lies in his absence of activity, in not "holding out to
the world"9 the instructions to his agent. Thus in certain cases the
principal is held to a requirement that he make known his dona-
tion of authority not only to the agent, but also to the world. In
these cases the agent is said to possess inherent authority, or in-
herent agency power.9 5
Inherent authority may in general be found when the principal
places his agent in a position that in practice or custom owns the
exercise of certain powers." In such cases principal, not outside
91. Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 242 F. 923 (2d Cir.
1917).
92. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 766 (1869). See also W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 8F.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 27; W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 8D.
The English authorities recognize apparent authority, but classify it under "power," in
which law enables an agent to act in excess of actually donated authority. See, e.g., R. Pow-
ELL, supra note 50, at 33-34.
94. See W. SEAVEY, supra note 50, at § 59B.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 8A; W. SEA VEY, supra note 50, at § 8F.
The English authorities give the name "usual authority" to inherent agency power. See, e.g.,
R. POWELL, supra note 50, at 38-42.
96. Certain authorities follow Holmes on this point, who otherwise disagree with him.
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person, must assume the risk of the agent acting in a customary
manner, even though he has been endowed with less than custom-
ary authority. If the principal wishes to limit this customary au-
thority, he must successfully inform the world of the limitation.
Inherent authority extends actual authority as far as the authority
customarily possessed by one in the position of the agent. Thus,
inherent authority accords binding validity to an action, when it is
taken by one who occupies a certain position. It is a first step to-
wards accomplishing process: an action receives binding validity
not because it has in terms been authorized, but because it is taken
by one who occupies a position.
To be sure, the process of inherent authority may not wholly
be distinguished from content. The position in which the principal
places his agent is entirely defined by the decisions taken by those
who occupy the position. The position does not stand apart from
its collection of decisions. Indeed, the collection of decisions defin-
ing the reach of inherent authority does not appear significantly
different from the collection of decisions created in the ordinary
grant of authority. Thus, "you may have my authority to purchase
a gross of pencils," defines a collection of decisions, all within the
power of the agent, regarding, for example, color and hardness of
the lead, manufacturer and price, and so on. Similarly, "you have
authority to manage my investment in potatoes," defines a collec-
tion of decisions such as a manager of investments would make.
Both authorizations set a boundary of permissible decisions ac-
cording to the criterion of practice or custom. It would seem im-
possible to distinguish one from the other.
Yet a distinction between ordinary and inherent authority
marks the latter as a step towards process. To fulfill his authority
to purchase pencils, the agent must make several subsidiary deci-
sions. Each follows directly upon the general decision to purchase
pencils and would not be required in the absence of a general deci-
sion. The subsidiary decisions have no autonomous significance.
They are strictly moments in the entire decision underlying the
pursuit of the authority.
Managing an investment presents a different case. One does
not do it in the way one purchases a gross of pencils. Once he de-
See note 84 supra. They ascribe the finding of inherent authority to pure decisions of policy.
See, e.g., F. MECHEM, OUTLRMs OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 111 (P. Mechem ed. 1952).
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cides on the matter, a person may hold purchasing a gross of pen-
cils as a purpose, so that accomplishing it constitutes legal action.
A person could never hold managing an investment as an immedi-
ate purpose. Therefore, accomplishing it cannot directly constitute
legal action. Fiduciary obligation permits the sovereign to hold
persons liable for duties that in contract would be impermissibly
vague or indeterminate.
Managing an investment is better understood as a system of
discrete purposes emanating from the collection of subsidiary deci-
sions. None of the subsidiary decisions is taken with a thing so
vague as management directly in view. Each subsidiary decision
stops at its own horizon, and only after each has been taken ac-
cording to its own necessities does management emerge as the sys-
tem of purposes emanating from these subsidiary decisions. In con-
trast to the subsidiary decisions created by the authority to
purchase pencils, management decisions have strictly an autono-
mous significance.
In this manner, the position from which inherent authority
draws its power stands apart from the collection of subsidiary deci-
sions. The position does not embrace some crucial or preeminent
decision, but is the abstract system of purposes emanating from
decisions found together in custom or practice. The validity of a
decision not authorized in terms is thus tested by whether it fits
into the system of purposes emanating from a collection of deci-
sions, each of which can be justified in its own terms. The position
supplies only a secondary justification, flowing not from the grant
of authority, but from custom and practice. Justification on the
grounds of position comes from without the agency relation as a
system of purposes supplied by practice or custom, whereas justifi-
cation in the case of ordinary authority must come from within the
relation as a perfection of the principal's intentions. In this sense,
testing the validity of an action by reference to a position, inherent
authority shows the rudiments of process.
IV. PARTNERSHmP: THE STRUGGLE TowARDs ENTITY
When private persons enter into contracts, they avail them-
selves of a facility provided by the state: the enforcement of expec-
tations created by their exchange of promises.97 The relation be-
97. See note 45 supra.
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tween private person and state is that of user and provider of a
facility. It is not so simple in agency. At its root is the fiduciary
relation, whose purpose concerns the state interest of entrusting
action to persons with judgment. Fiduciary relations do not, in the
first instance, constitute a facility. The state does not provide them
so that private persons might avail themselves of their use, as they
avail themselves of contract. Thus, when private persons turn
fiduciary relations to their own use, as agency, they transform a
doctrine of public intent into a facility, as if it were contract.
Agency is an arrogation of public authority, where contract is only
the exploitation of a facility provided by public authority. For this
reason, it is easier to imagine that contract, more than agency, is
the rational consequence of the natural isolation of single persons,
as some anti-positivists suppose.9 8 Agency is inexplicable without
authority, which, in turn, depends upon the presence of a sover-
eign. But neither agency nor contract departs from the model of
social life as single persons governing affairs under the thrall of
sovereign power. The world of entities other than sovereign simply
fails to appear in these doctrines. Agency, for example, speaks only
of single persons. It provides for the shifting of accounts between
them, but does not depart fundamentally from the scheme of sin-
gle persons. The institutional element of agency, which is author-
ity, comes close to a legal recognition of social reality apart from
persons, but does not achieve it. Authority is the possession of a
single person.
Were the construction of associations to stop at agency, the
intersection between sovereignty and private affairs would be nar-
row. Agency accomplishes little in the construction of institutions
and actions that constitute the entities of society. It simply puts
the power of sovereignty behind one person acting in the name of
another. If the construction of associations stopped at agency, then
a large measure of the institutions and actions society takes for
granted would be left to happen in the interstices of sovereignty,
without its invaluable, energizing support.99 Many elements of so-
cial behavior thrive in the interstices.100 Nevertheless, if the sover-
98. See, e.g., F. HAYEK I, supra note 9, at 101-10.
99. See text accompanying note 156 infra.
100. The state does not, for example, protect the interest of a bridal pair in the gift.
giving of guests to their betrothal or the host of a dinner to reciprocating invitations. Yet
wedding guests give gifts and dinner invitations are reciprocated. Even business affairs,
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eign did not aid in their construction, one could no more imagine
the existence of certain entities in society, than contract without
the settled expectation that public authority will enforce the ex-
change of promises. Society would be left to accomplish a vast cul-
ture of relations in the silence of public authority.
If law is to recognize social reality, it must incorporate an ele-
ment, such as authority, without reference to single persons. Au-
thority, or its equivalent, must exist apart from the world of per-
sons. Inherent authority is just such an element. Its source is a
"position"; it is not the intention of a person. The state recognizes
and protects in inherent authority the social notion of "position,"
carrying with it certain accepted portions of authority. Inherent
authority is a step towards the recognition of social reality, its fu-
sion into the dialogue of state and person that begins in the fiduci-
ary relation.
Today the calculation of authority from a position, rather than
intention, seems a prudent contribution to the ordering of private
affairs. Yet, the doctrine of inherent authority was not formulated
until 1917, nor used before 1870.101 Agency functioned for centu-
ries without it, even as the social conditions one associates with
inherent authority, such as large-scale organization and a market
economy of routine participants, were apparent both to the per-
sons who used agency and to those who controlled its legal destiny.
The legal profession either did not perceive, or perceived and re-
jected, inherent authority as a result of their animus toward think-
ing in terms other than person (or natural fairness) and state (or
public policy). At least in the law of associations, they have re-
sisted the premises and arguments that may be drawn from posi-
tion and the structure of positions, we call "society. 10 2
In agency, the struggle against the social idea of position is
only incidental to the structure of the relation. Whether inherent
authority is recognized or not does not affect agency principles. In
which are commonly thought to depend on the harshness of sovereignty, show greater reli-
ance on private sanctions, such as maintaining trade or ideal motives of self-regard, than the
vendors of legal services allow themselves to admit. Cf. J. AusTn, supra note 12, at 86-87;
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV.
55 (1963), reprinted in L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 145
(1969).
101. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 supra.




partnership, built in part upon agency, the struggle against a social
idea of position provides the context of the relation. Partnership is
the form of association devoted to a social idea of the merchants,
called the "firm." 103 The "firm," as such, is a position in society
created by the usage of merchants, not a legal construction. Part-
nership is thus the first association encountered that refers to
something outside itself, the usage of merchants. With the single
exception of inherent authority, all other constructions-contract,
fiduciary relations, and agency-take the position that their legal
reality is their social reality. They are the consequence of the sim-
ple application of a sovereign purpose to the doctrine of persons.
Partnership starts from the novel premise that legal reality and
social reality, partnership and firm, are in potential opposition.
The law of partnership is a record of common law struggle against
a social idea.
Section A describes the social idea of the firm, and the failure
of common law to assimilate it to the doctrine of persons. Section
B presents an episode in the history of partnership law, in which
common law judges attempted to find a criterion to modify the
doctrine of persons. Section C, finally, records the modern ac-
comodation of partnership law to the social reality of the firm.
A. Common Law Failure to Assimilate the Social Idea of the
Firm to the Doctrine of Persons
The guiding problem of partnership law is what to make of a
social entity, such as the firm. The firm is a'going concern.04 It is a
business whose owners take from it only profit, devoting the first
part of returns from transactions to replenishing the business in
order to sustain it. It is not a joint venture, a single transaction,
whose viability over time is of no concern to the participants in the
transaction.10 5 The problem of partnership law, then, is how to rec-
ognize the fact the firm is a business for profit, a going concern.
Practitioners of common law have for the most part attempted
103. See C. CooKE, CORPORATON, usT TAND COMPAN 40, 48 (1950); T. HADDEN, COM-
PANY LAWS AND CAPiTALISM 10 (2d ed. 1977); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
197-99 (1926). See also W. LImiLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 146-48 (10th
ed. 1935).
104. See generally J. COMMONS, Tim LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPIrrALISM 143-213 (1924).
But see note 103 supra.
105. See generally A. BROMBPG, C ANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 35 (1968).
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to assimilate the firm into their doctrine of persons. They have
considered the firm as an aggregate of relations among natural per-
sons. The firm, as such, was admitted to these relations only as it
was impossible to construct them out of more elementary relations
having nothing to do with the social idea of the firm.108 The "com-
mon law theory of partnership," as commentators call it, 107 seeks
to accord as little recognition as possible to the social reality of the
firm, consistent with the overriding purpose of giving it legal foun-
dation. Thus partnership is a mutual agency of partners, whose au-
thority extends over the business conducted by the firm. 08 It is
also a joint tenancy or tenancy in common in assets of the firm. 09
It is an agreement dividing the profits of the firm among part-
ners.110 It is, finally, all these elementary relations among single
persons bound together by contract into the package called
"partnership.""1 1
Yet the program of constructing the firm out of known and
elementary relations failed in certain instances to give adequate
protection to its social reality. Thus partnership property, owned
in common by partners, ought to be available to any of them for
any purpose consistent with the use of the others. The doctrine of
joint ownership does not by itself tolerate further restriction on
use of the property." 2 Yet there was the practical necessity that
partnership property be devoted only to the business of the firm,
and law accommodated this result.1 3 Consequently, joint owner-
ship did not accurately describe the condition of partnership prop-
erty, and was in due course dropped.1
4
In other instances, the failure was corrected by a tacit change
in doctrine. Thus, the scope of authority with which one partner
can bind the others is said to extend to the business of the part-
106. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 18.
107. See id. at 19.
108. See id. at 272-73.
109. See id. at 228; H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 445 (3d ed. 1939); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.8, at 36 (1952).
110. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 66-69.
111. See id. at 31, 33-35, 38, 42-43.
112. See 2 AmRcIAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.2, at 7-8 (1952).
113. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 630-34 (1915).
114. See Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, 29 HAv. L. REV. 838, 847, 849-50
(1916); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism (PT. 1), 29




nership.11 5 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts took
the business to include "any act for carrying on in the usual way
business of the kind carried on by the firm of which he is a mem-
ber."' Authority thus springs from the "business of the kind car-
ried on by the firm," not necessarily from an explicit statement of
the partners. This is precisely the doctrine of inherent authority,
appearing sub silentio in partnership law at least a century before
it appeared in agency, and masquerading as the trivial application
of agency principles to partnership.
The challenge faced by the common law theory has been to
discover a criterion for judging whether to modify the aggregate of
elementary relations, accommodating them to the social reality of
the firm, or to displace them altogether. The contrariety and pro-
fusion of opinions, theories, attitudes, and rationales in partner-
ship law, shifting within a single jurisdiction and from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, suggests that such a criterion should not be easy to
find.
B. Search for a Criterion to Modify the Doctrine of Persons: Cox
v. Hickman
Partnership actions made their way from courts merchant into
common law courts in the course of the seventeenth century, as the
former fell into disuse.1 17 The merchant idea of the firm, as an en-
tity in private life distinct from the persons who compose it, had
then either to be accepted or rejected. The tenor of the law de-
manded rejection. Yet no one believed that the firm is merely an
aggregate of persons. The social reality of the firm simply did not
fit into the favorite categories of common law.
Common law courts protected their doctrines from the alien
law merchant and merchant practice without rejecting them.
Merchant ideas, such as the firm, were classified as custom, pecu-
115. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 272-77; W. LmDLEY, supra note 103, at 173-
77.
116. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c.39, § 5 [hereinafter cited as Partnership
Act]. Cf. A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 276-77; 3 J. KENT, COMmENTAR Is ON AmiCAN
LAW 46-47 (11th ed. 1867); W. LINDLEY, supra note 103, at 176.
117. See Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 470, 478-80 (1902),
reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmRCAN LEGAL HIsTORY 34, 43-44 (1909); Scrut-
ton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELmccr ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7, 13.
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liar to a status group with special traditions. As custom, the law
merchant and merchant practice were found as fact, never entering
the system of doctrine.1 8 Common law courts absorbed merchant
ideas without digesting them. Thus, the legal profession avoided
confronting the problem, whether the firm could be successfully as-
similated to the doctrine of persons.11 9
Even once the ruse of custom was dropped, partnership es-
caped absolute rationalization. Lord Mansfield happened not to
decide many partnership cases, so that he could not extend to
partnership his efforts at building the commercial law from En-
glish, merchant, and continental sources.1 20 As the American au-
thority, Professor Burdick, wrote at the turn of the century:
A learned writer has said: "The law of partnership rests on a foundation com-
posed of three materials: the Common Law, the law of Merchants, and the
Roman law." It must be added that these different materials, like the iron
and the clay in the image of Nebuchadnezzar's vision, do "not cleave to one
another." Nor has English jurisprudence yet shown its ability to assimilate
them.12
1
An episode in the history of partnership law, lasting from 1775
to 1860, provides a clue to the problem of assimilating the social
idea of the firm to the legal construction of partnership. At the
start of the period, DeGrey, C.J., stated as dictum in the case of
Grace v. Smith 22 the rule that persons who share profits incur lia-
bilities as if they were partners.9 8 DeGrey based his dictum on an
opinion by Lord Mansfield, Bloxham v. Pell,12 4 in which the princi-
ple had been used without being identified; it was both used and
stated twenty-three years later in Waugh v. Carver.125
118. See Burdick, supra note 117, at 480; Scrutton, supra note 117.
119. Blackstone discusses partnership only as an example of entities that must use eq-
uitable accounting, and one other similarly negligible instance. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Com-
MENTAuES ON THE LAws OF ENGLrND 437 (Chitty ed. New York 1844).
120. See Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HAav. L. REV. 762, 765
(1915).
121. F. BuRDIcK, THE LAw OF PARTNmRHar 2 (1899).
122. 2 W. Black. 998, 96 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B. 1774).
123. The only question is, what constitutes a secret partner? Every man who has
a share of the profits of a trade, ought also to bear his share of the loss. And if
anyone takes part of the profit, he takes a part of that fund on which the credi-
tor of the trade relies for his payment.
Id. at 1000, 96 Eng. Rep. at 588.
124. 2 W. Black. at 1000, 96 Eng. Rep. at 588.
125. 2 H. Black. 235, 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P. 1793).
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One should be clear that DeGrey's principle is a doctrine of
liability, not a theoretical statement about partnership. The spirit
of the age was similar in this respect to the spirit of ours. They
could impose liability in a case from immediate considerations of
fairness or public policy, without serious regard for the suitability
of the imposition in an entire system of doctrine. It may be fair or
good policy that one whose sole connection with a firm is a share of
profits be responsible for a share of losses. But liability for losses
without participation in the business or possession of partnership
property to prosecute the business hardly comports with the rest
of partnership doctrine.
DeGrey's principle requires one to take the position of an out-
sider. From that position, it is fair and good policy to hold one who
shares profits and nothing else responsible for the debts of the
firm. Yet the principle neglects entirely the interior of the firm,
that it is an association of persons conducting a business in com-
mon, whose liabilities flow from that pursuit. The mere sharer of
profits only partly resembles a member of the firm: he takes his
livelihood from it, but is not responsible for the decisions that pro-
duce his livelihood. He is not called on to exercise judgment. At
the least, DeGrey's principle violates the thematic preference of
our tradition, that only those capable of judicious action be re-
sponsible for its consequences. But more, it is an attempt to ex-
punge from the law of partnership any reference to the social idea
of the firm. DeGrey reduced the firm to a single attribute: the
sharing of profits. Other attributes may attach, but are not the es-
sence. One is a member of the firm to outsiders if one has a share
of profits, even though one is not a member, in the business or
practical sense of doing business in the firm. DeGrey's reduction
solves the problem of assimilating the social idea of the firm to the
legal construction of partnership. It eliminates the firm.
Lord Lindley's conclusion in his treatise on the English Part-
nership Act of 1890 that, "[o]ne feature peculiar to the English law
of partnership. . . was the persistency with which the firm, as dis-
tinguished from the partners composing it, was ignored both at law
and in equity," may be excessive. 126 It is true, nonetheless, that in
the era of Grace v. Smith partnership law reached a pitch of ani-
mus toward the firm. Even as the principle was explicitly applied
126. W. LiNDLEY, supra note 103, at 4.
[Vol. 29
SOVEREIGNTY AND ASSOCIATIONS
in that era, its harshness was limited. Thus, it was held that per-
sons who share only gross returns are not liable as partners.127 A
distinction was drawn, as Lord Lindley notes, between a payment
out of profits and a payment varying with them.12 8 In Ex Parte
Hamper Lord Eldon stated that a person would be liable as a part-
ner only if he has a right to "a part of the profits as such," thus to
an account.129 This already entails a severe limitation on the opera-
tion of DeGrey's principle.
The era of Grace v. Smith came to an end in 1860, with the
celebrated case of Cox v. Hickman.5 0 Scheduled creditors of a
deed of arrangement, who were to be paid their debts out of the
profits of their debtor's business, were held not liable for debts
contracted by the trustee carrying on the business pursuant to the
deed. The Lords reasoned that sharing profits did not of itself es-
tablish the trustee as agent of the scheduled creditors. Waugh v.
Carver was distinguished on the ground that profits in that case
were to be shared to an indefinite extent, whereas profits in Cox v.
Hickman were shared only to the limit of the scheduled debts. The
principle of Grace v. Smith was in form preserved. Yet, as Lord
Lindley points out, the distinction between limited and unlimited
sharing of profits is one that cannot be maintained against outsid-
ers under DeGrey's reasoning. 131 Cox v. Hickman redirected atten-
tion to the interior of the firm. One could no longer be held liable
as a partner unless one was in fact a partner, or held oneself out as
a partner, or was the agent of a partner. " 2
The episode of DeGrey's principle did not leave the systematic
law of partnership unimproved. By searching for an essential attri-
bute of partnership, DeGrey laid bare and clarified the legal signif-
icance of the firm. The fault in the doctrine of Grace v. Smith was
127. Benjamin v. Porteus, 2 H. Black. 590, 126 Eng. Rep. 720 (C.P. 1796).
128. Ex Parte Hamper, 17 Ves. 403, 34 Eng. Rep. 156 (Ch. 1811). See W. LINDLEY,
supra note 103, at 54.
129. Ex Parte Hamper, 17 Vest. at 411-12, 34 Eng. Rep. at 158-59.
130. 8 H.L.C. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (H.L. 1860).
131. See W. LINDLEY, supra note 103, at 57.
132. See id. at 57-59. The American Uniform Partnership Act singles out sharing prof-
its for a presumption of partnership. Uniform Partnership Act § 7(4) [hereinafter cited as
UPA]. Certain relations, such as debtor-creditor, wage earner-employer, and landlord-ten-
ant, are protected, so that sharing profits, as rent for example, does not engage the pre-
sumption. The presumption can probably be dissipated by the presentation of sufficient
evidence that no partnership exists, according to factors set forth in the statutory definition
of partnership. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 76-80.
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that it encouraged confining consideration of partnership to the es-
sential attribute, without pursuing its consequences throughout the
entire idea of the firm. Grace v. Smith thus provided a beginning
for the acceptance and systematic understanding of the firm as
such in partnership law, which prior to Grace v. Smith had been
resistant to the firm and somewhat confused by it. Modern law de-
motes the essential attribute, sharing profits, to a presumption of
partnership, a point from which the true investigation whether a
partnership is present may begin.'" 3 Community of profits under
modern law provides a criterion by which elements of the firm may
be sifted for inclusion in the legal construction of partnership. It is
not an end of analysis, but a beginning, animating the legal con-
cept of the firm.
C. Partnership Law and the Ongoing Character of Business
Profit indicates the potential for ongoing business activity.184
It is the practical and theoretical measure that determines whether
an enterprise ought to survive. The social reality of profit is the
survival of an enterprise. Profit is its license to carry on.
Within thirty years of Cox v. Hickman, partnership law ex-
plicitly incorporated protection of the ongoing character of busi-
ness. The English Partnership Act of 1890 defines partnership as
"the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a busi-
ness in common with a view of profit."1 35 The old indicium, com-
munity of profits, takes second place to "carrying on a business in
common." The American Uniform Partnership Act of 1916 has an
identical formulation: "A partnership is an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."136
Both statutes make partnership reflect the social reality of the
firm, "carrying on a business in common."1 3 7
Before Cox v. Hickman, events having nothing to do with the
business of a partnership could easily disrupt it. A partner was al-
133. Partnership Act § 2(3) ("The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business.... ."). Section 7(4) of
the Uniform Partnership Act is identical.
134. See text accompanying notes 104 & 105 supra.
135. Partnership Act § 1(1).
136. UPA § 6(1).
137. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at 248, for the suggestion that the guiding pur-
pose of the Uniform Partnership Act is protecting the ongoing character of business.
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lowed to assign his share of partnership property to strangers. Un-
less the assignment breached an agreement of the partners, the
only penalty was dissolution of the partnership. l 8 The power of a
partner to assign his interest in partnership property does not of
itself go farther than his plenary power to dissolve the partnership,
wind up its affairs, and distribute his portion of partnership prop-
erty to whomever he pleases. The right of assignment surpasses the
power of dissolution, however, in that it serves as the foundation
for attachment of a partner's share of partnership property for
debts of a partner unrelated to the business of the firm. s13 Attach-
ment puts in the hands of a personal creditor of a partner, a stran-
ger to the partnership and its business, the decision whether the
property and affairs of the partnership remain intact. Considera-
tions alien to the firm dictate its future. The right of attachment
for personal debts of a partner derives sensibly from simpler doc-
trines, but reflects total neglect of the firm.
Such protection as the firm received under the old law was
perplexing, variable, and indistinct.1 0 It is captured in the term
"partners' equities." The old law, as the new, recognized the right
of partners to insist that partnership property be used only for
business of the partnership.14 1 If a stranger to the firm came into
an interest in its property, he was subject to the same restraint on
use as was the partner from whom he derived his interest. 42 Even
so, protection of the firm was illusory, since the proper course of
attachment was early established as seizure of the whole property
by a sheriff, interrupting use of the property by the partnership.14
The necessity of seizure has been cured only by modern
legislation.1 44
In two doctrines crucial to the firm, assignment of partnership
property and its attachment by strangers, the legislative compila-
tions of partnership law in England and America, working at the
138. See id. § 77.
139. See id. §§ 42-43.
140. See Lewis, supra note 114, at 162.
141. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at § 40.
142. See id. § 43. The doctrine seems to have been established definitively in equity in
Skipp v. Harwood, 2 Swanst. 586, 36 Eng. Rep. 739 (Ch. 1747), and later made its way into
law.
143. See Heydon v. Heydon, 1 Salkeld 392, 91 Eng. Rep. 340 (K.B. 1693). See also
Lewis, supra note 114, at 162 n.5.
144. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at § 43.
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turn of the century on the heritage of Cox v. Hickman, encoded
the definitive recognition and protection of the firm. 145 The Uni-
form Partnership Act prohibits the assignment of a partner's right
in specific partnership property, except in connection with the as-
signment of rights of all partners in the same property.146 The En-
glish statute is not as explicit, but accomplishes the same result.
147
The Uniform Partnership Act also prohibits the attachment of or
execution on a partner's right in specific partnership property, ex-
cept on a claim against the partnership. 14  Similarly, the English
statute provides that "a writ of execution shall not issue against





Both compilations allow the assignment by a partner of the
profit to which he is entitled, defined as his interest or share in the
partnership. 150 Assignment of the interest or share in the partner-
ship does not dissolve the partnership, nor does it remove the as-
145. It is interesting to note that the English Partnership Act gives explicit recognition
to the firm, whereas recognition in the American Uniform Partnership Act is only implicit.
Thus section 4(1) of the English statute gives the name "firm" to partners collectively carry-
ing on a business, and couches many relations among partners and of partners to strangers
in terms of relations to the firm. The draftsmen of the Uniform Partnership Act, first Ames
and then Lewis, use the term "partnership" where Pollock, the draftsman of the English
statute, uses "firm." The technical distinction is that the English statute defines partnership
as a relation among persons; the Uniform Partnership Act defines it as an association of
persons. See text accompanying notes 135 & 136 supra. The English Partnership Act thus
requires a separate term for the collectivity of partners, whereas the collectivity of partners
is incorporated in the American definition of partnership. The true ground of distinction
probably Hes elsewhere, in the relative absence of dispute in England about the nature of
partnership, whether it is a person separate from the partners. Compare W. LINDLEY, supra
note 103, at 146-48, with A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at § 3. See also Crane, supra note
114, at 838; Crane, supra note 120, at 762; Lewis, supra note 114, at 158, 291; Lewis, supra
note 113, at 617. See generally E. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORA-
TION (1929). The English were not betrayed, as the Americans, by debate whether a partner-
ship is an artificial person, and could directly construct their legislation according to the
principle that partnership is a set of legal relations reflecting the social reality of the firm.
146. UPA § 25(2)(b).
147. All property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the
partnership stock or acquired, whether by purchase or otherwise, on account of
the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership business...
must be held and applied by the partners exclusively for the purposes of the
partnership. ....
Partnership Act, § 20(1).
148. UPA § 25(2)(c).
149. Partnership Act, § 23(1).
150. Partnership Act, § 31(1); UPA § 27.
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signing partner from participation in the firm, or substitute the as-
signee in his place.151 Thus a partner may assign values he has
placed or produced in a firm to the extent that the assignment
does not disturb the ongoing character of the firm. Furthermore,
both compilations provide the charging order, a form of attach-
ment of the interest or share in the partnership to satisfy the sepa-
rate debt of a partner.152 The charging order may lead to dissolu-
tion of the partnership, but does not cause the removal of a
partner during its pendency. 53
The result of legal development since Cox v. Hickman is rec-
ognition and protection of the firm as an ongoing enterprise. The
firm is insulated from the private affairs of its partners. It must
survive or fail subject only to the harsh discipline of profit. Yet the
affairs of the firm are allowed to affect its partners without limita-
tion. Partners are personally responsible for conducting the busi-
ness of the firm, and must bear its consequences. This is in strict
accord with the thematic preference of our tradition. 5
Indeed, from the perspective of the construction of associa-
tions, the most telling contribution of the absorption of the firm
into partnership is the recognition that partners do more than re-
present each other as agents possessing a limited and explicit grant
of authority. They manage the business of the firm.1 55 The source
of a partner's authority to act is management of the firm, and not
the mutual grant of authority from partner to partner. The notion
of management acknowledges the presence in partnership of inher-
ent authority, where the position from which the partner draws his
authority is the firm.
V. THE ARTwxcuLL PERSON
Both agency and fiduciary relations were constructed from a
relation between sovereign, on the one hand, and natural persons,
on the other. Law could capture their entire reality. The doctrines
of agency and fiduciary obligation follow strictly upon the applica-
151. Id.
152. Partnership Act, § 23(2); UPA § 28.
153. Partnership Act, § 33(2); UPA § 32(2).
154. Cf. Lewis, supra note 114, at 172; Wright, Opposition of Law to Business Usages,
26 COLUM. L. RPv. 917, 927 (1926).
155. Section 24(3) of the UPA lists the right to participate in management as one of the
three property rights of a partner.
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tion of a sovereign purpose to the ancient doctrine of persons. In
fiduciary relations it is to entrust judgment about action to persons
who can be responsible for its consequences. In agency, the pur-
pose is to accede to the strengthening of persons through their
usurpation of the sovereign's concern for the propriety of action.
Partnership was the first association encountered that could not be
constructed from the simple application of a sovereign purpose to
the doctrine of persons. The reality encompassed by partnership is
not legal, but social, and thrives even in the absence of aid from
the sovereign. Consequently, it has never been clear whether by
recognizing the firm in law the sovereign has aided it, or merely
assimilated it as a rival system of power. "8
Aid or assimilation, much of the communication between sov-
ereign and firm has been accomplished by the creation of novel
relations among persons. One instance of aid, however, could only
apparently be delivered in the manner of the others, as a relation
among single persons. This is the right of a partner to participate
in managing the firm. As it is phrased, it is a right owned by a
single person. The singular phrasing of the right is usual.157 Never-
theless, the right of a partner to participate in management dis-
solves, upon inspection, into the right of partners collectively to
manage. The singular phrasing of the right cannot be sustained,
especially in large firms. Common law offered two forms of associa-
tion, trust and joint stock company, to accomodate certain needs of
large firms within the scheme of natural persons. The defect of
these forms is that they hewed to an individual, natural concept of
legal responsibility, and failed to reflect responsibility in large
firms. An adequate form of responsibility appears in the artificial
person.
A. Persons and the Management of Large Firms
What can the statutes and textbooks mean when they say that
a partner has the right to participate in managing the firm? When
a partnership agreement contains a formal mechanism for manage-
ment, an executive committee or voting by partners, the right to
participate means that a partner cannot be excluded from the
156. See Part IV, Section C supra.
157. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at § 48; W. LINDLEY, supra note 103, at
377-78; J. PARSONS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRmNCPLES OF PARTNERSHW § 152 (1889).
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mechanism without his consent.'58 However, partnerships do not
need a formal mechanism. It is then difficult to recognize partici-
pation, since the partnership agreement has not defined it. Stat-
utes, to be sure, may define participation, as voting for example, in
the absence of agreement. Even if partners agree, however, or if a
statute speaks in the absence of agreement, partners can be bound
by the unapproved action of a partner within the ordinary course
of business of a kind conducted by the firm, if the olne who seeks to
bind them does not know that the action is one required to be ap-
proved. 159 A partner, therefore, may be in a position to make a de-
cision, acting alone, especially when no formal mechanism has been
provided. Stripped to its fundamentals, the singular phrasing of
the right to manage means that a partner has the power, on certain
occasions, to act without the concurrence of his partners.
As is often the case with rights, the singular phrasing con-
fronts reality. If a partner were continually to make unpopular de-
cisions, his partners would dissolve the partnership. The singular
phrasing labors in a world where its assertion could spell the end
of the ongoing business. If, instead, one looks at the right to con-
tinue business, its phrasing must be altered. Because any partner
can threaten a decision on his own, other partners must deal with
him. The right of a partner to participate means only that he can
force the others either to come to terms or dissolve the partner-
ship. Even if a formal mechanism is present, the partners in the
minority on a given issue must overall or to some extent be satis-
fied. Informal coming-to-terms is implicit even in a formal process
of decision. The positive meaning of the right to participate is not
singular, but collective, the constant coming-to-terms of partners.
Yet coming-to-terms is possible only when the firm is of such
quality and size that differences among partners can be reconciled.
If they cannot, either because the firm has grown beyond managea-
ble size or because members jockey for preeminence in manage-
ment, the ongoing nature of the enterprise is threatened by forces
having nothing to do with its external economic success. The haz-
ard of an informal procedure is tolerable only when daily reconcili-
ation is probable or when few depend on continuing the enterprise.
158. Cf. W. LNDLEY, supra note 103, at 392-95.
159. See text accompanying notes 115 & 116 supra.
1980]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Neither condition is met in large firms."' 0
Even if owners could come to terms, many in a large firm can-
not be bothered to do so. Complex enterprises involve vast sums of
capital.which a small number of persons invest in a variety of busi-
nesses. Moreover, as the scale of enterprise expanded in England
and America, certain possessors of landed wealth converted it into
ownership of firms. Neither owner of capital, nor landed proprietor
could be burdened with active participation in all the firms into
which their wealth led them. A class of passive investors devel-
oped, eager to entrust to a handful of participants the active man-
agement of their firms.""
Both pressures, the scale of enterprise and the rise of a class of
passive investors, led to the managment of large firms by a minor-
ity of owners, by the end of the seventeenth century at the lat-
est.162 This was unavoidable reality. In larger firms, the collective
right to manage could not be left to an informal mechanism. Cer-
tain tasks and decisions had definitively to be assigned to certain
persons, whose number was far smaller than the number of owners.
Moreover, some tasks and decisions arose only upon the determi-
nation of tasks and decisions of more general importance. The co-
terie of managers would be moved to arrange themselves into a
hierarchy to reflect the hierarchy of tasks and decisions. This could
not be accomplished through the informal mechanism of owners,
since discipline cannot weather the threat of dissolution. The law
had either to accommodate the constriction and specialization of
management, or watch them proceed in silence.16 3
Accommodation of the needs of management could not pro-
ceed by the construction of relations among natural persons. As-
similation of large firms to that branch of the doctrine of persons
was, for reasons set forth above, impossible. Yet two ways of pro-
ceeding, which seem to depart little from the scheme of natural
160. Certain industries, such as investment banking, accounting, or law, can survive the
presence of enormous firms, because transactions in these industries depend on personal
trust and knowledge throughout the industry about the conditions of each transaction.
Hence members are relatively powerless to initiate a transaction without the concurrence of
their fellows.
161. See C. COOKE, supra note 103, at 40-42, 132.
162. See id. at 50.
163. See A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISmLE HAND 484-500 (1977); J. HURST, THE LEGM-




persons,'1 were gradually developed by lawyers and the commer-
cial class from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The first is
the trust, and the second, the joint stock company.16 5
B. Trust and Joint Stock Company as Devices for Managing
Large Firms
The trust is an unusual association of persons. Settlement of
the trust creates a fiduciary obligation running from trustee to
beneficiary, but only over property put into the trust."' Unlike the
mere fiduciary relation, however, deeds of settlement can specify
the nature and purpose of benefits to be given the beneficiary.1 6 7
The trust thus resembles an agency, which also specifies the nature
and purpose of benefits conferred, but by a donation of authority,
rather than by the transfer of legal title to property. 68
Two characteristics of the trust are outstanding for passive in-
vestors and their coterie of managers. First, the beneficiary of the
trust does not have legal title to trust property, and is precluded
by law from acting on it.11' This characteristic is clearly suited to
the necessity of constricting management in large firms. Second,
liability of the beneficiary is limited to benefit he can receive from
trust property, and if he is settlor as well as beneficiary, to the
trust property itself.170 So if a passive investor puts himself in the
legal position respecting his investment of a settlor who is also
beneficiary, he is precluded from management, and absolved of lia-
bility beyond his investment.
164. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 317; F. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 321-404.
165. See generally, C. COOKE, supra note 103, chs. 3-6; A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH Busi-
NESS CoMPLANY AFTER Tm BuBBLE ACT 1720-1800 (repr. New York 1971); 4 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 408-80 (1924); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
206-22 (1926); A. KUHN, A ComIARATiVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS ch. 3 (No. 123
of the Columbia University Studies in the Social Sciences) (1912); W. SCOTT, THE CONSTiTU-
TION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (1912).
But see Comment, Operation of Business by Trustees, 1967 DuKE L.J. 321 (1967).
166. See 1 A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRusTS § 2.5.
167. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 4; 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TUSTS § 4.
168. Trust and agency share more than fundamental homology. It is probable that
agency, as well as the trust, originated in the use. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 228 (S. Milsom ed. 1968) (2d ed. 1898).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) Or TRuSTs § 175, Comment a; id. § 277, Comment a.
Cf. note 60 supra.




The trust device brought with it several practical and legal
consequences that came in varying degrees to be considered desira-
ble by business during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
First, the trust has, for all practical purposes, perpetual existence
(up to the limit imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities), for the
deed of settlement can provide that a trustee removed by death,
disability or design be replaced.171 Second, the trust has continuity
of existence, since its integrity as a legal entity does not depend on
the identity of the beneficiaries2 Third, the beneficiaries are able
to transfer their interests without permission of the trustee .1 7 This
contrasts with partnership, which dissolves upon the withdrawal of
one of its partners, and requires the consent of all partners before
a new partner may be added to the firm.17 The transferability of
beneficial interests has, in turn, two consequences. First, a dissatis-
fied investor need not dissolve the legal entity in order to take his
money out of the enterprise; and second, he is able at any time to
realize his investment simply by selling his beneficial interest. The
investment of a passive investor in a trust is thus more liquid than
the investment of a partner, and its removal less disruptive to the
ongoing condition of the enterprise. Fourth, the trust can sue and
be sued in the name of the trustees, a small number of persons. 175
Fifth, the trust can transfer property in the name of the
trustees. 6
Especially in the United States, it is not the constriction of
management, but limitation on liability of investors that has cap-
tured the modern imagination about trusts.1 7 7 However, the notion
that limited liability is the most desirable benefit law can bestow
on business is bad history, and worse understanding of the require-
ments of business.7 8 When the trust was first used extensively, in
171. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 60, at § 304.
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTs § 36; 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRusTS § 36.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 132; 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
132.
174. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 105, at §§ 5, 74; W. LINDLEY, supra note 103, at 435,
658-60. The latter requirement is known as "delectus personae."
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 261, 280; 3 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 261; 4 A. ScOTT, THE LAW OF TRuSTS § 280.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190; 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
190.
177. See, e.g., Powell, Passing of the Corporation in Business, 2 MINN. L. REV. 401
(1918).
178. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J.
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the eighteenth century, no other legal form provided absolute lim-
ited liability. King's court had bestowed limited liability on mem-
bers of chartered companies in 1440.111 But in 1671, Salmon v.
Hamborough Company held that a creditor of a company could
force it to levy upon its shares (the "leviation"). 10 Hence, in the
classic era of capital development, English law made it difficult,
not impossible, to pierce the formal protection of limited liability.
Full protection was restored to companies only in the Limited Lia-
bility Act of 1855.181 Even several American states, whose legal
practitioners assumed that chartered companies had limited liabil-
ity at common law, took it away for a time by statute in the early
nineteenth century.8 2 The trust simply had no competitors in of-
fering limited liability to investors, and had investors desired it,
one would have expected the trust to possess even greater popular-
ity than it in fact enjoyed, suggesting that for the eighteenth cen-
tury limited liability was not the issue it is today.
It would be wrong to suppose, however, that limited liability
counted for nothing. A trustee could not effectively shield himself
from liability for managing the property of the trust. Only recently
has the law permitted a trustee to make contracts without assum-
ECON. HIST. 1, 8-17 (1945). For contemporary discussions of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the several devices of association, see E. WARREN, supra note 145; Kessler & Yorio,
Choosing the Appropriate Form for the Small Business, CORPORATION L. REV. 291, 299-304
(1978). Among the advantages, limitation on liability in the eighteenth century was of nar-
row legal importance. In contracts it could be achieved by negotiating for a limitation on
damages. The presence of prior statutory or common law limitations would not, in practice,
necessarily protect the passive investor, when, for example, the creditor of an enterprise
demands the personal guarantee of its investors. Limitation on liability could have been
crucial only for torts committed outside the aegis of contract. The narrow reach of tort
liability in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries casts in doubt the commercial signifi-
cance of even the crucial case. See T. PLucKNETr, A CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
459-60 (5th ed. 1956).
Business opposed the provision of limited liability as often as they supported it. See J.
ANGELL & S. AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 370-74
(1832); A. DuBois, supra note 165, at 94, 226; J. HURsT, supra note 163, at 26-27. Their
attitude, after all, could not wholly escape the lawyers' culture of responsibility. Investment
could as easily be frightened off by the relaxation of responsibility as it would be en-
couraged. Dodd maintains that the ultimate significance of limited liability was to facilitate
a market in shares. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 390 (1954).
179. Y.B. Pasch. 19 Hy. VI pl. 1 (p.64) (per Markham). See A. DuBoIs, supra note 165,
at 98-104; 3 W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 484 (1927).
180. 1 Ch. Cas. 204, 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (1671).
181. Limited Liability Act, 1855, 19 & 20 Vict., c.47.
182. See J. ANGELL & S. AMES, supra note 178, at 357-64.
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ing personal responsibility, though common law did allow him to
seek indemnity from trust property. 183 He was personally liable at
common law for amounts greater than the fund at his disposal.
The trustee of assets constituting an enormous firm could only be
disquieted by the prospect of liability for its operations.184
The trust has a second defect. If a trust beneficiary is allowed
any say in management, he becomes a partner of the trustees, and
the trust is destroyed.18 5 He may not even participate in selecting
trustees, by election or otherwise, though as settlor he could ini-
tially have appointed them. His only remedy for dissatisfaction is
to sell his beneficial interest. He exercises no reforming power over
management. Trustees are accountable only in the judgment of eq-
uity for breach of trust, not in the judgment of trust beneficiaries
as to the most effective management of their affairs. The price of
limited liability is resignation by investors of the power to have
any say in management. This accords with the thematic prefer-
ence: common law would not tolerate the grant of limited liability
to trust beneficiaries together with their retention of substantial
control over trust affairs. Yet retention of control by passive inves-
tors is desirable. If the sole remedy of the passive investor is to sell
out, management is beyond control, at least up to the value of the
fund at their disposal. Decline in the value of the beneficial inter-
est has at best indirect effect on the fortunes of management, un-
less they too possess beneficial interests. The owners must be able
to turn management out for destroying the value of their interests.
Within the value of the fund at their disposal, it is the control ex-
ercised by beneficial owners that inculcates responsibility in
trustees.
The trust has a third defect. Though it accomplishes the con-
striction of management, it cannot definitively parcel out tasks and
decisions among trustees, or arrange them into a hierarchy to mir-
ror the hierarchy of tasks and decisions. The coterie of trust man-
183. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TRusTs §§ 224, 261; 3 A. ScoTT, LAw OF TRUSTS §§
224, 261.
184. In all probability it was the unlimited liability of trustees that reduced the popu-
larity of the trust in the eighteenth century, as much as the cause advanced by Holds-
worth-the too rigid confinement of business policy in the deed of settlement. See 4 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 479-80 (1924).
185. See H. BALLANTNE, BALLANINE ON CORPORATrONS 18-20 (rev. ed. 1946); E. WAR-
REN, supra note 145, at 383-400. But see Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Busi-
ness Trusts, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 423 (1923).
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agers behave much as if they form a partnership, playing with the
higher stakes given them by passive investors.
These defects-the unlimited liability of managers, the entire
loss of control by passive investors, and the incapacity of the trust
to structure management-are corrected in the second way of as-
similating enormous firms to the doctrine of persons: the joint
stock company. Though there were a profusion of variations, it is a
simple device.180 Investors pool their assets, their. stock. Title to
the stock may be retained by the investors in joint tenancy, but
more likely would be placed in a board of managers, in a single
member of the board, or in a trustee. Investors would by contract
divest themselves of the power to manage the stock. Together they
would appoint a board of directors or certain officers as agents to
manage the affairs of the stock. The mode of appointment was
commonly election at specified times by holders of shares. Each
investor would have a right to such portion of profits of the stock
as declared by the managers and provided for in the contract form-
ing the company. The rights and interests of an investor could be
transferred, even though common law opposed the assignment of a
chose in action (which the interest was187) and though the Bubble
Act of 1720 forbade the transfer of shares in a joint stock company
created by contract absent the overt exercise of royal or parliamen-
tary power.'" Because he was a principal of the managers, the
owner of shares was jointly and severally liable for their wrongs,
regardless of his proportional investment in the company.
While preserving its benefits, the joint stock device amelio-
rated the defects of the trust. By virtue of their power to elect
management, the passive investors retained a form of control, and
could force managers to be responsible within the value of the joint
stock. Because passive investors occupied the legal position of
principals, they could parcel out tasks to each of the managers,
their agents. They could even create a hierarchy of agents. Finally,
managers could enter into contracts using only the names of their
principals, the owners, or look to the owners to indemnify them for
torts committed in the proper exercise of authority, even to an
amount beyond the value of the stock. A manager, in other words,
186. See generally A. BRoiam o, supra note 105, at § 34; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 50-57 (2d ed. 1970); E. WAEN, supra note 145, at 327-682.
187. See A. DuBois, supra note 165, at 359.
188. Bubble Act, 1720, 5 George I c.28.
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was given the limited liability accorded to an agent, who, after the
trust beneficiary, is the second figure the common law gives a sort
of limited liability.
Nevertheless, the joint stock device had two defects, one prac-
tical, the other theoretical. The practical defect was imposition of
joint and several liability upon holders of stock, regardless of pro-
portional investment. Trust and joint stock company put the or-
ganizers of business upon a choice, whether to subject managers to
liability for the disproportionate transactions under their control,
or to put the liability on passive investors without relation, as in
partnerships, to their individual interests in the business. To be
sure, as Henn points out, the liability of holders of stock was often
only theoretical, since they were dispersed and hidden from
view.189 Even so, the common law compelled organizers to choose
between managers and investors as the ultimate repositories of re-
sponsibility. In offering the choice, it was moved strictly by the
thematic preference, that those who are capable of action be re-
sponsible for its consequences. The trust beneficiary has no say in
managing its assets; hence, he is free of liability. The holder of
stock has the limited say of choosing personnel for management;
hence, he is subject to liability. Similarly, the manager of trust
property is beholden only to his conscience operating under the
loose standard of breach of trust; the manager of a joint stock is
beholden to his holders of stock. The first is exposed to liability,
the second is not.
The problem with this scheme is that the holder of stock exer-
cises only mild control: he helps select personnel. He is barred
from real participation in management, yet. is subject to the harsh
prospect of liability for actions he has not taken, nor in specific
terms authorized. He merely calls upon the managers of the stock
to manage, nothing more.
C. A New Form of Responsibility: the Artificial Person
The Hobson's choice of liability in common law does not accu-
rately reflect the realities of management and responsibility in
large firms. By its insistence on the thematic preference, common
law required holders of stock to assume liability for operating an
enterprise they did not operate, and trustees to be responsible for
189. See H. HENN, supra note 186, at 16-17, citing A. DuBois, supra note 165.
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the fortunes of an enterprise from which they could expect no
profit. The reality of the matter, as in partnership, was the eco-
nomic survival of the firm. Common law was probably correct in
supposing that no holder of stock, taken alone, would have suffi-
cient stake in that survival, were his liability limited to his interest
in the firm. Exposure to liability is the antidote to irresponsibility.
The holders of stock en masse, however, through the device of
election, would be no more irresponsible than the ordinary person.
The interest possessed meets the interest required, even if liability
is limited to stock in the firm. The penalty for imprudence is death
of the firm as an ongoing enterprise, which is enough for the the-
matic purpose of responsibility.
. Yet, common law was incapable of awarding limited liability
to managers at the same time as passive investors. Its fear was that
there would then be no one responsible. Common law neglected
the reality of the firm as enterprise, that its internal mechanism of
responsibility and accountability is sufficient to guarantee nor-
mally prudent action. The separation of management from invest-
ment created a new form of responsibility that common law found
itself incapable of acknowledging.
The new form of responsibility differs little from the one
found in political organization."" The control of investor over
manager through election is weaker than the control of principal
over agent, but stronger than the control of trust beneficiary over
trustee using the remedy of breach of trust. It is a political species
of control, which should have been sufficient, absent the thematic
preference, to confine liability to stock of the ongoing firm.
The presence in large firms of a new species of control, hence
responsibility, raises the theoretical difficulty of the joint stock de-
vice. A manager is not an agent, even one given broad and ill-de-
fined authority. He derives authority from appointment or election
to office, not, as in agency, from a direct manifestation of consent.
His authority is the product of appointment or election, not the
intentions of persons.11 Yet our legal culture mistakenly considers
election as a typical manifestation of consent, leading ineluctably
190. See J. COLEMAN, POWER aND TIM STUnauRE OF SocmTY 81-84, 102-04 (1974).
191. Modem corporation statutes separate the managers of joint stock acting as trust-
ees, the board of directors, from managers acting as agents, the officers. Members of the
board are elected in order to manage the joint stock over-all. Officers are appointed as
agents by the board to implement its decisions.
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to imposition of liability on holders of stock. Election, rather, is a
process in which persons participate, merely filling a position or
office made available to them by public authority. Holders of stock
authorize officers as much as a principal authorizes his agent who
exercises inherent authority, that is, in reality, not at all.
Appointment, or election, is thus the first step in the program
of priocess, which, as has been shown, was completed only centuries
after the introduction of joint stock companies in the doctrine of
inherent authority.'29 Like inherent authority, election derives au-
thority from position rather than from intention. Because private
law was not prepared for it, lawyers did not at first recognize office
as a form of inherent authority. Their view of office did not carry
with it extensive ramifications in private law, such as limited liabil-
ity. Stockholders were agents, not electors of offices. Only in the
eighteenth century did lawyers acknowledge an overtly private
form of inherent authority in the notion of managing a partner-
ship." s The complete devolution of office into private law was left
to our century, with an explicit doctrine of inherent authority.
When firms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries be-
came the prevalent institution of English economic life, private law
was prepared to account for the management of firms only as a
regime of persons, using agency and trust. The latter, after all, re-
quire the delegation of fewer elements of sovereignty to private
persons than does office. Corporations remained monopolistic in-
struments of public law, at least through the era of Blackstone.
Lawyers and merchants, Cooke has shown, considered largely ad-
ventitious the connection of joint stock company to corporation, of
private firm to creature of the state.' " The failure of the Bubble
Act of 1720 to suppress joint stock companies and destroy the
trade in their shares was practical proof, if any was needed, that
modern capitalistic forms could flourish absent the open support of
sovereign power. They had its tacit support, instead, in the com-
mon law instruments of association reviewed in this Article.
Lawyers would depart from the scheme of natural persons
only reluctantly. '5 They stood by the fiction that private life is the
192. See Part I, section C supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 115, 116 & 155 supra.
194. See C. CooKE, supra note 103, at 18. See also Gower, Some Contrasts Between
British and American Corporation Law, 69 Ha.v. L. Rxv. 1369, 1373-74 (1956).
195. See Pollock, Common Law, Has it Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?,
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preserve of persons. An officer may be described, consistent with
the scheme of persons, as a trustee without title to the property in
his trust. He is an agent whose principal is no natural person. 196
Lawyers were forced, in the course of the eighteenth century, to
the position that managers of a firm are agents of an invisible prin-
cipal; the firm itself, an invisible or artificial principal or person.9 e7
To preserve the fiction of persons in private life, lawyers availed
themselves of the medieval doctrine of artificial persons. 19s
But the state maintained the proposition that only the sover-
eign has authority to create an artificial person.199 Even as they
sought to preserve the rupture between state and economy brought
on in the era of the Bubble Act, lawyers were led by both logic and
experience to embrace the explicit intervention of sovereignty in
autonomous economic affairs.
The disingenuous simplicity of the proposition that only a sov-
ereign may create artificial persons should now be apparent. If it
27 LAw Q. Rav. 219 (1911).
196. Even today, these two ways of accounting for the position of those who manage
firms, enormous or otherwise, are commonly found in the literature of corporations.
197. See C. CooKE, supra note 103, at 92. The roots of the artificial person can be
traced in more primitive forms of association. Trusts take the first step away from the
method of assimilating social reality to relations among natural persons. The world of natu-
ral persons is a world of owners managing property. No legal relation more primitive than
the trust departs significantly from this model. In the fiduciary relation, management is
perforce given over to another. In agency, it is voluntarily given over, and in partnership a
group of persons pools property to manage it jointly. Trusts wrench the natural order of
property owners. To the world the trustee appears as a property owner. Yet in reality, he
merely serves as trustee. It is not his property that he manages, but the property of another,
even though he has title to the property and assumes the risk of managing it. The textbooks
say that the trust separates legal from beneficial ownership. This conceals the fact that in
the trust the natural order of property owners no longer exists. The true "owner" of the
property, the beneficial owner, does not own it in contemplation of law. The legal owner, the
trustee, has no natural motive for carrying on prudent management, only the legal motive
that he lies accountable for breach of trust. The property owner does not own property, and
the legal owner has no natural motive for managing it. Trusts abrogate the world of natural
persons as property owners, while in form preserving it. The joint stock company abrogates
the form as well as the substance of the world of natural persons. For an opposing view, see
Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM. L.
REV. 285, 289 (1909).
198. See 3 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 482-87 (3d ed. 1927); 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MArrLmAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486-97 (2d ed. 1898). But see Wang,
Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory) in the Year Book, 58 LAW Q. Rav. 498
(1942), 59 LAw Q. Rav. 73 (1943).
199. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 45-46 (1926); Holdsworth, En-
glish Corporation Law in the 16th & 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 382-83 (1922).
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means that only monarchs and parliaments may create them, and
not courts, then it is wrong. For private persons, acting through
their forum in the state apparatus, the courts, have created artifi-
cial persons in trusts and joint stock companies for over three hun-
dred years. The proposition must, indeed, be construed to mean
that only monarch and parliament may shield at once both partici-
pants in a firm, manager and passive investor, from personal liabil-
ity.200 The incapacity of courts proceeded not from any fundamen-
tal notion that legislature and executive possess more appropriate
power, but rather from the courts' thematic preference that re-
sponsibility at all times be placed on one or another natural per-
son. Judges were reluctant, without help from other branches of
government, to develop a private law concept of political
responsibility.
CONCLUSION
The task of creating political responsibility in private law has
been left to recent times. Political leaders, lawyers, businessmen,
and scholars are actively debating whether public purposes should
be accomplished directly by the state through regulation, or indi-
rectly in the autonomous determinations of economic actors. The
corollary of imposing social responsibility on economic actors is
that courts ultimately may judge whether economic actors are ful-
filling it.- At stake is the method by which public purpose on an
issue is created: by a clash of interests in legislation, or by the mo-
lecular process of decentralized decision. No one yet knows the
shape of institutions that would sustain a socially responsible, de-
centralized economy.
Those who enter the debate, from whatever position, should
be aware that common law has routinely been the vehicle through
which the state apparatus distributes public authority to private
economic actors. Imposition of social responsibility on such per-
sons would be only the final step in a centuries-old process. Office,
managing the business of a partnership, and inherent author-
ity-these doctrines and institutions lend recognition to a quiet
200. Even this statement is false. In the early nineteenth century Courts of Chancery
upheld the limited liability of both owners and managers of insurance companies, whose
enabling documents attempted to meld the advantages of the trust and joint stock device.
See C. CooKE, supra note 103, at 87-88.
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fact: every time persons act through an association-whether
agency or partnership, company or trust-they exercise a portion
of sovereignty. Only the kernel of associations, the fiduciary rela-
tion, does not yet reflect this distribution of sovereignty. Courts
and legislators must reconstruct the fiduciary relation, as they have
reconstructed higher forms of association, to impose public powers
and obligations on persons in the relation. Thus reconstructed, the
fiduciary relation would include notions of both social benefit and
social responsibility.201
201. The theorists of social responsibility have embarked on this project. For a review
of social responsibility literature, see 1& Ackerman, Public Responsibility and the Business-
man: A Review of the Literature, in Top MANAGEMENT. BUSINESS STRATEGY AND PLANNING
(B. Taylor & K. Macmillan eds. 1973). For an introduction to theories of collective benefit,
see K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVDUAL VALUES (Cowles Foundation Monograph No.
12, 1951); M. OLSEN, JR., TiE LOGIC OF CoLcanvn ACTION (Schocken Paperbacks ed. 1968).
1980]

